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SPECIFYING NODES AS SETS OF CHOICES
Peter A. Streufert
Department of Economics
University of Western Ontario
Abstract. Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) specify each node in
a game tree as a sequence of actions. It is well-known that such ac-
tions can be replaced by choices (i.e. agent-specific actions) without
loss of generality.
I find that this sequential formulation is redundant in the sense
that nodes can be equivalently specified as sets of choices. The
only cost of doing so is to rule out absent-mindedness. My analy-
sis encompasses both ordered and unordered information sets and
both finite and infinite horizons. (This specification of nodes as
sets of choices differs from the literature’s specification of nodes as
sets of outcomes.)
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) specify each node in a game tree by
the sequence of actions leading to it. For simplicity, assume that each
agent (i.e. information set) has its own actions, and let these agent-
specific actions be called choices. It is well-known that this entails no
loss of generality.
This paper introduces and justifies the idea of formulating each node
as a set of choices rather than a sequence of choices. This differs from
Date: September 6, 2015. Keywords: extensive form, game form. JEL Classi-
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ment of Economics, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, N6A 5C2,
Canada.
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2 1. Introduction
formulating each node as a set of outcomes, as is done by von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944) and Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2005, 2008,
2013). The relation between this paper’s choice-set formulation and
their discrete outcome-set formulation is explored in Streufert (2015b).
There are circumstances in which this paper’s choice-set formulation
is especially useful. These circumstances arise when choices or actions
are more convenient than outcomes, and sets are more convenient than
sequences.
For example, such circumstances arise when Streufert (2015a) sets
up to characterize the supports of consistent assessments (Kreps and
Wilson (1982)). The critical step is to find an ordering that (a) extends
the assessment’s infinite-relative-likelihood relation among nodes and
(b) has a representation that is additive across the choices leading to
each node. Similar steps in the literature have been relatively obscure.
Since each node can now be regarded as a set of choices, this step re-
duces to finding an ordering that (a) extends a partial ordering among
sets of choices and (b) has a representation that is additive across the
choices in each set. More abstractly, it reduces to finding an ordering
that (a) extends a partial ordering among sets and (b) has an additive
representation. That abstract problem was addressed by Kraft, Pratt,
and Seidenberg (1959) while laying the foundations of probability the-
ory. Its solution requires nothing more than Farkas’ Lemma. Thereby,
an aspect of Kreps-Wilson consistency becomes more transparent.
1.2. Overview
Section 2 merely restates the definition of an extensive form that ap-
pears in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). I call my restatement an “OR∗
choice-sequence form”. The purpose of my restatement is to conserve
notation. For example, I implicitly specify agents (i.e. information sets)
by mimicking an analogous construction in the outcome-set formula-
tion of Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2005). In spite of such notational
streamlining, an OR∗ choice-sequence form is at the full generality of
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). In particular, it admits continuum
choice spaces, unordered agents (i.e. information sets), and both finite
and infinite horizons.1
1This paper extends an earlier version (Streufert (2012)) that only admitted
finite horizons.
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Section 3 then introduces the concept of a “choice-set form” in which
the nodes are choice sets rather than choice sequences. This new for-
mulation is specified so as to highlight its many similarities with an
OR∗ choice-sequence form.
Section 4 begins with Proposition 4.1, which shows that an OR∗
choice-sequence form has no-absent-mindedness (Piccione and Rubin-
stein (1997)) iff there is a one-to-one correspondence between the form’s
choice sequences and the sets of choices that they list. Thus the or-
der explicit in the sequential notation is redundant in any OR∗ choice-
sequence form with no-absent-mindedness. This suggests that any such
form can be converted into an equivalent choice-set form simply by con-
verting each of its sequences into the set of choices that it lists.
Theorem 1(a) does this. Then the remainder of the theorem shows
a number of ways in which the original no-absent-minded OR∗ choice-
sequence form is “equivalent” to the derived choice-set form. Part (b)
uses Proposition 4.1 to show that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the original choice-sequence nodes and the derived choice-set
nodes. Part (c) shows that finite choice-sequence nodes coincide with
finite choice-set nodes. Then (d) shows that choices play similar roles
in the two formulations, and finally, (e) and (f) naturally translate
feasible choices and immediate predecessors from one formulation into
the other.
Theorem 2 shows that the conversion process itself is a bijection from
the class of no-absent-minded OR∗ choice-sequence forms onto the class
of choice-set forms. This one-to-one correspondence further strength-
ens the notion that no-absent-minded OR∗ choice-sequence forms are
“equivalent” to choice-set forms.
Section 5 derives several corollaries for choice-set forms. Corol-
lary 5.1 characterizes the predecessors of a finite node. Corollary 5.2
characterizes the nonterminal nodes. Corollary 5.3 characterizes the
predecessors of an infinite node. And finally, Corollary 5.4 shows that
every pair of nodes has a greatest common subnode, which in turn
implies that the collection of nodes is a sublattice. These natural but
nontrivial results are used extensively by Streufert (2015b).
2. Reviewing choice-sequence forms
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This section merely restates the definition of an extensive form that
appears in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, page 200). Nodes are spec-
ified as sequences, and Osborne (2008, Section 3) credits Rubinstein
with the important idea of doing so. Accordingly, I call my restate-
ment an “OR∗ choice-sequence form”. The purpose of my restatement
is to conserve notation.
2.1. Choices and nodes
Let C be an arbitrary set and call a member c of the set C a choice.
Then let s¯ denote an arbitrary sequence in C. In other words, let s¯ be
a choice sequence. Such an s¯ can be an infinite sequence of the form
(s¯1, s¯2, ...), a nonempty finite sequence of the form (s¯1, s¯2, ...s¯L(s¯)), or
the empty sequence {}. Note that the length of a finite sequence s¯ is
denoted L(s¯), and that the length L({}) of the empty sequence {} is
defined to be zero.
For any nonempty sequence s¯, let
1s¯` := (s¯1, s¯2, ... s¯`)
be the sequence consisting of the first `≥1 elements of s¯, where `≤L(s¯)
if s¯ is finite. By convention, let 1s¯0 be the empty sequence {} regardless
of s¯. Call 1s¯` a subsequence if either (a) s¯ is infinite or (b) s¯ is finite
and ` < L(s¯). Further, for any finite sequence s¯, let
s¯⊕(c) := (s¯1, s¯2, ... s¯L(s¯), c)
be the concatenation of s¯ with the one-element sequence (c). Finally,
for any sequence s¯, let
R(s¯) := { c | (∃`) s¯`=c }
be the range of s¯. For example, R takes (s¯1, s¯2, ...) to {s¯1, s¯2, ...}. Sim-
ilarly, R takes (s¯1, s¯2, ... s¯L(s¯)) to {s¯1, s¯2, ... s¯L(s¯)}.
An OR∗ choice-sequence preform is a pair (C, N¯) such that
N¯ is a nonempty collection of sequences in C ,(1a)
C ⊆∪R(N¯) ,(1b)
N¯rT¯ = { s¯ | (∀`≥1) 1s¯` ∈ T¯ } ,(1c)
(∀t¯6={}) 1t¯L(t¯)−1 ∈ T¯ , and(1d)
(∀t¯ 1, t¯ 2) F¯ (t¯ 1)=F¯ (t¯ 2) or F¯ (t¯ 1)∩F¯ (t¯ 2)=∅ .(1e)
2. Reviewing choice sequences 5
where
T¯ := { n¯ | n¯ is finite } and(2)
F¯ := { (t¯, c) | t¯⊕(c)∈T¯ } .(3)
Call a member n¯ of the set N¯ a node.2 Further, call F¯ the feasibil-
ity correspondence. Accordingly, call F¯ (t¯) the set of choices that are
feasible at t¯.
(1a) states that nodes are choice sequences. It also specifies that
there is at least one node. Accordingly, {} must be a node by an
elementary argument using (1c) and (1d). The smallest OR∗ choice-
sequence preform is specified by C = ∅ and N¯ = {{}}.3
(1b) states that every choice appears in at least one node. This is
accomplished by C ⊆ ∪R(N¯) since R(N¯) = {R(n¯)|n¯∈N¯} is the collec-
tion of the ranges of all the choice sequences in N¯ . This assumption
entails no loss of generality in applications, for if it were violated, one
could simply remove the superfluous choices from C.
(1c) in the ⊆ direction states that all the subsequences of an infinite
node are themselves nodes. Conversely, the ⊇ direction states that if
all the subsequences of an infinite sequence are nodes, then that infinite
sequence is itself a node.
(1d) requires that another node results when the last element of a
nonempty finite node is removed. By repeated application, this implies
that all the subsequences of a finite node are themselves nodes.
(1e) permits the implicit specification of agents (i.e. information
sets). In particular, let
H¯ := { F¯−1(c) | c } ,(4)
and call an element h¯ of H¯ an agent. Thus an agent h¯ is specified as
a collection of nodes F¯−1(c) from which some choice c is feasible. This
implicit specification of agents mimics a similar construction in Alo´s-
Ferrer and Ritzberger (2005, page 791, Definition 7(i)). The following
lemma shows how it is related to an explicit specification of agents. I
use the implicit specification to conserve notation.
2Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) refer to such a sequence as a “history” and
denote it by h. I reserve “h” for an agent (i.e. information set).
3As a matter of convention, I denote the empty set by {} when it is regarded
as a node. Elsewhere I denote it by ∅.
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Lemma 2.1. Suppose that (C, N¯) satisfies (1a)–(1d). Derive its T¯
(2) and F¯ (3).
(a) Assume (1e) and define H¯ by (4). Then
H¯ partitions F¯−1(C) ,(5a)
[(∃h¯){t¯1, t¯2}⊆h¯] ⇒ F¯ (t¯1)=F¯ (t¯2) , and(5b)
h¯1 6=h¯2 ⇒ F¯ (h¯1)∩F¯ (h¯2)=∅ .4(5c)
(b) Conversely, (1e) holds if there is an H¯∗ that satisfies (5). Fur-
ther, any H¯∗ that satisfies (5) equals the H¯ defined by (4). (Proof A.3.)
(5a) states that H¯ partitions the collection of nonterminal nodes. To
conserve notation, I do not define a special symbol for the collection
F¯−1(C) = { t¯ | F¯ (t¯)6=∅ } of nonterminal nodes.
(5b) states that the same choices are feasible from any two nodes in
an agent h¯. This condition is standard, and it allows one to interpret
F¯ (h¯) as the set of choices feasible for agent h¯.4
(5c) states that different agents have different choices. This condition
entails no loss of generality in applications because one can always
introduce enough choices so that agents never share choices (this is
only a matter of notation).
2.2. Players
Let I be an arbitrary set, and call an element i of the set I a player.
An OR∗ choice-sequence form is a pair ((Ci)i, N¯) such that
(∪iCi, N¯) is an OR∗ choice-sequence preform (1) ,(6a)
(∀i6=j) Ci∩Cj = ∅ , and(6b)
(∀i)(∀t¯) F¯ (t¯)⊆Ci or F¯ (t¯)∩Ci=∅ .(6c)
(6a) and (6b) state that the choices in the preform (∪iCi, N¯) are
allocated to the players i by means of their choice sets Ci. Accordingly,
a preform can be understood as a one-player form. To be precise,
(C, N¯) is a preform iff ((C), N¯) is a form, provided that (Ci)i = (C) is
taken to mean I = {1} and C1 = C.
(6c) permits the implicit assignment of agents and nodes to players.
In particular, define (H¯i)i by
(∀i) H¯i = { F¯−1(c) | c∈Ci } .(7)
4As with any correspondence, the value F¯ (h¯) of the correspondence F¯ at the
set h¯ is defined to be {c|(∃t¯∈h¯)c∈F¯ (t¯)}. (5b) implies that (∀t¯∈h¯) F¯ (t¯) = F¯ (h¯).
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Then H¯i is the set of agents belonging to player i, and ∪H¯i is the set of
nodes belonging to player i. In the following lemma, a prepartition of
a set A is a collection of disjoint subsets of A whose union is A. Note
that the empty set can be an element of a prepartition.
Lemma 2.2. Let ((Ci)i, N¯) be an OR
∗ choice-sequence form (6) with
its C=∪iCi, F¯ (3), H¯ (4), and (H¯i)i (7). Then
(a) {H¯i|i} is a prepartition of H¯ and
(b) {∪H¯i|i} is a prepartition of F¯−1(C). (Proof A.4.)
The above admits the possibility of a vacuous, as opposed to nonex-
istent, chance player. Accordingly, one could require that the player
set I always contains a chance player io, and then set Cio = ∅ to model
the special case of no randomness. In this special case, one would have
(a) H¯io = ∅ (that the chance player has no agents) and (b) ∪H¯io = ∅
(that the chance player has no nodes). This very minor innovation can
simplify notation, as in Streufert (2015a, page 38, last paragraph).
Finally, note that an OR∗ choice-sequence game could be specified by
augmenting an OR∗ choice-sequence form with (1) chance probabilities
and (2) preferences. For (1), one would specify, for each chance agent
h¯∈H¯io , a probability measure over F¯ (h¯). For (2), one would specify, for
each nonchance player i∈Ir{io}, a binary relation over lotteries over
the set N¯rF¯−1(C) of terminal nodes.
2.3. Discussion
An OR∗ choice-sequence form (6) conserves notation by implicitly
specifying agents and by implicitly assigning agents and nodes to play-
ers.
Nonetheless, an OR∗ choice-sequence form is at the full generality of
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Definition 200.1). (1) It admits con-
tinuum choice spaces. Thus, since a type is a chance choice, it admits
continuum type spaces. (2) It admits unordered agents (i.e. informa-
tion sets). Thus it admits arbitrarily arranged agents that cannot be
specified in multistage formulations such as von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944, Sections 9 and 10) and Myerson (1991, page 296). (3)
It admits both finite and infinite horizons.
There are also two minor differences. (1) An OR∗ form imposes (5c),
which states that each agent has its own choices. As is well-known,
8 2. Reviewing choice sequences
this imposes no loss of generality. (2) An OR∗ form allows the chance
player, like any other player, to have nonsingleton agents.
Although difference (1) is inconsequential technically, it does corre-
spond to a difference in nomenclature: while an Osborne-Rubinstein
form has “actions” a, an OR∗ form has “choices” c. Thus an OR∗ form
conforms with the standard nomenclature in the outcome-set literature,
where a property like (5c) is implicit (von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944, Sections 9 and 10), Ritzberger (2002, Section 3.2), Alo´s-Ferrer
and Ritzberger (2005, 2008, 2013)).
3. Introducing choice-set forms
This section introduces a new kind of extensive form in which the
nodes are sets of choices rather than sequences of choices.
3.1. Choices and nodes
As before, let C be an arbitrary set, and call a member c of the set
C a choice. A choice-set preform is a pair (C,N) such that
N is a nonempty collection of subsets of C ,(8a)
C ⊆ ∪N ,(8b)
NrT = { ∪T ∗ | T ∗ is an infinite chain in T } ,(8c)
(∀t6={})(∃!c) c∈t and tr{c}∈T , and(8d)
(∀t1, t2) F (t1)=F (t2) or F (t1)∩F (t2)=∅ ,(8e)
where
T := { n | n is finite } and(9)
F := { (t, c) | c/∈t and t∪{c}∈T } .(10)
Call a member n of the set N a node, and call F the feasibility corre-
spondence.
(8a) states that nodes are choice sets. It also states that there is at
least one node. Accordingly, {} must be a node by Lemma B.5. The
smallest choice-set preform is specified by C = ∅ and N = {{}}.
(8b) states that every choice appears in at least one node. This
assumption entails no loss of generality in applications, for if it were
violated, one could simply remove the superfluous choices from C.
(8c) relates infinite nodes to finite nodes. By definition, a chain in T
is a subcollection T ∗ ⊆ T such that any two distinct nodes t and t′ in
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{} {a} {a,r}
{a,d} {r,d}
a r
d
Figure 1. C = {a, r, d} and N = {{}, {a}, {a,r}, {a,d}, {r,d}}.
This violates (8d) because {r,d} has no last choice.
{} {r}
{d} {r,d}
r
d
r
d
Figure 2. C = {r, d} and N = {{}, {r}, {d}, {r,d}}. This vio-
lates (8d) because {r,d} has two last choices.
T ∗ satisfy t ⊂ t′ or t ⊃ t′. The union of an infinite chain of finite nodes
is obviously an infinite set. The ⊇ direction of (8c) further stipulates
that such a union must be a node. The ⊆ direction of (8c) requires that
every infinite node is the union of at least one chain of finite nodes.5
(8d) is discussed in this and the next two paragraphs. To begin, let
a last choice of a finite node t be any choice c∈t such that tr{c} is also
a node. In other words, let a last choice of a finite node be any choice
in the node whose removal results in another node. (8d) requires that
every nonempty finite node has a unique last choice.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 provide three examples. In each case, the figure’s
caption defines (C,N), and accordingly, the definition of the example
is complete without the illustration itself. Each illustration links two
nodes with a choice-labelled line exactly when (a) that choice is a last
choice of the larger set and (b) the smaller set is the larger set without
that choice. The example of Figure 1 violates (8d) because {r, d} does
not have a last choice. The example of Figure 2 violates (8d) because
{r, d} has two last choices. Meanwhile, the example of Figure 3 satisfies
(8d) because each of its four nonempty nodes has a unique last choice.
5Later, Corollary 5.3(b) will show the sense in which this chain is unique.
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{}
{b}
{a}
{a,d}
{a,r}
b
a
d
r
Figure 3. C = {a, b, r, d} and N = {{}, {a}, {a,r}, {b}, {a,d}}.
This is a choice-set preform (8).
For notational ease, define
p := { (t, tr{c}) | c∈t and tr{c}∈T } .(11)
By (8d), p is a function from Tr{{}} into T . Call p the immediate
predecessor function.6 By inspection, the range p(Tr{{}}) of p equals
the domain F−1(C) of F .7
(8e) permits the implicit specification of agents. In particular, let
H := { F−1(c) | c } ,(12)
and call an element h of H an agent. Thus an agent h is specified
as a collection of nodes F−1(c) from which some choice c is feasible.
This implicit specification of agents is directly analogous to the implicit
specification (4) of agents in an OR∗ choice-sequence preform. Accord-
ingly, the following lemma is directly analogous to Lemma 2.1, and the
discussion of that lemma applies here as well.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that (C,N) satisfies (8a)–(8d). Derive its T
(9) and F (10).
(a) Assume (8e) and define H by (12). Then
H partitions F−1(C) ,7(13a)
[(∃h){t1, t2}⊆h] ⇒ F (t1)=F (t2) and(13b)
h1 6=h2 ⇒ F (h1)∩F (h2)=∅ .(13c)
6Section 5 will define the concept of one node “preceding” another. Then
Corollaries 5.1(b) and 5.3(b) will characterize the predecessors of a node in terms
of the immediate predecessor function p.
7Section 5 will define the concept of a “terminal” node. Then Corollary 5.2(c)
will show that the collection of nonterminal nodes is F−1(C).
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(b) Conversely, (8e) holds if there is any H∗ that satisfies (13).
Further, any H∗ that satisfies (13) equals the H defined by (12).
(Proof B.3.)
3.2. Players
Let I be an arbitrary set, and call a member i of the set I a player.
A choice-set form is a pair ((Ci)i, N) such that
(∪iCi, N) is a choice-set preform (8) ,(14a)
(∀i6=j) Ci∩Cj = ∅ , and(14b)
(∀i)(∀t) F (t)⊆Ci or F (t)∩Ci=∅ .(14c)
(14a) and (14b) state that the choices in the preform (∪iCi, N) are
allocated to the players i according to their choice sets Ci. They are
directly analogous to (6a) and (6b) for OR∗ choice-sequence forms.
(14c) permits the implicit assignment of agents and nodes to players.
In particular, define (Hi)i by
(∀i) Hi := { F−1(c) | c∈Ci } .(15)
Then Hi is the set of agents belonging to player i, and ∪Hi is the set of
nodes belonging to player i. This specification of (Hi)i is directly anal-
ogous to the specification (7) of (H¯i)i in an OR
∗ choice-sequence form.
Accordingly, the following lemma is directly analogous to Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 3.2. Let ((Ci)i, N) be a choice-set form (14) with its
C=∪iCi, F (10), H (12), and (Hi)i (15). Then
(a) {Hi|i} is a prepartition of H and
(b) {∪Hi|i} is a prepartition of F−1(C).7 (Proof B.4.)
The last two paragraphs of Section 2.2 showed how to augment an OR∗
choice-sequence form with (a) chance probabilities and (b) preferences
over terminal nodes. The choice-set analog is straightforward given
Section 5’s definition of terminal choice-set nodes (in accord with Note
7, the collection of terminal choice-set nodes is NrF−1(C)).
4. Equivalence
4.1. No-absent-mindedness and the injectivity of R|N¯
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Let ((Ci)i, N¯) be an OR
∗ choice-sequence form (6) with its T¯ (2) and
H¯ (4). As in Piccione and Rubinstein (1997, page 10), an agent h¯ is
absent-minded if there exist t¯ and 0 ≤ ` < L(t¯) such that {1t¯`, t¯} ⊆ h¯.
In other words, an agent is absent-minded if it contains both a node and
one of this node’s predecessors. Accordingly, no-absent-mindedness is
the property that
(∀h¯)(∀t¯)(∀0≤`<L(t¯)) {1t¯`, t¯} 6⊆ h¯ .(16)
No-absent-mindedness is weak. It is strictly weaker than perfect re-
call, and perfect recall is assumed by many authors including Kreps
and Wilson (1982). Specifically, they define perfect recall as the com-
bination of their equations (2.2) and (2.3). Their equation (2.2) is
equivalent to no-absent-mindedness (16).8 Meanwhile, their equation
(2.3) imposes the additional assumption that players recall what their
own past agents knew and did. This second component of perfect recall
plays no role in this paper.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose ((C)i, N¯) is an OR
∗ choice-sequence form
(6) with its T¯ (2). Then the following are equivalent.
(a) ((Ci)i, N¯) has no-absent-mindedness (16).
(b) R|T¯ is injective.
(c) R|N¯ is injective. (Proof A.6.)
Proposition 4.1 relates no-absent-mindedness to the injectivity of
R|N¯ , where R (by its definition in Section 2.1) takes any sequence to
its range, and R|N¯ is the restriction of R to the form’s N¯ .
First note that R|N¯ must be injective when the agents of ((Ci)i, N¯)
are ordered. To see this, consider any n¯. Since a choice determines the
agent that plays it, the choices in R(n¯) must be played in the order of
their agents. Hence the set R(n¯) determines the sequence n¯.
But Proposition 4.1(a⇒c) goes further. It shows that R|N¯ is injective
even when the agents of ((Ci)i, N¯) are unordered, provided only that
no-absent-mindedness holds. For example, consider Figure 4,9 which
8Their x∈H(x′) translates to (∃h¯) {t¯, t¯′}⊆h¯ and their x 6≺x′ translates to
(/∃`≤L(t¯′)) t¯=1t¯′`.
9Imagine that Spy 1 and Spy 2 are racing to recover a document from a safe
deposit box. En route one spy realizes that if she reaches the box first, she can
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(f 1, ℓ1, ℓ2)ℓ2
(f 1, ℓ1, d2)
d2
(f 1, ℓ1)ℓ1
(f 1, d1)
d1
(f 1)
f 1
(f 2, ℓ2, ℓ1)ℓ1
(f 2, ℓ2, d1)
d1
(f 2, ℓ2)ℓ2
(f 2, d2)
d2
(f 2)
f 2
{}
h¯1
h¯2
Figure 4. An OR∗ choice-sequence form with no-absent-
mindedness. In accord with Proposition 4.1, R|N¯ is injective.
replicates the classic example of unordered agents from Kuhn (1953,
Figure 1), Gilboa (1997, Figure 2), Ritzberger (1999, Figure 1), and
Ritzberger (2002, Figure 3.8). Unordered agents give rise to choices
that can be played in different orders. Accordingly, the choices `1
and `2 in Figure 4 have been played in different orders at the nodes
(f 1, `1, `2) and (f 2, `2, `1). However, the choices in
R((f 1, `1, `2)) = {f 1, `1, `2}
can only be played in the order (f 1, `1, `2), and the choices in
R((f 2, `2, `1)) = {f 2, `1, `2}
can only be played in the order (f 2, `2, `1). Intuitively, this happens
because the set {f 1, `1, `2} contains f 1, and because the set {f 2, `1, `2}
contains f 2. This suggests that if a form has two choices whose order
is not exogenously determined, then any sequence that lists the two
choices must also list another choice (or set of choices) that determines
install a bomb that will explode when the other spy reaches the box after her. But
then she realizes that the other spy will be thinking the same thing, and hence,
if she opens the box when she reaches it, she will find either the document or an
exploding bomb. So, she considers destroying the bank without opening the box in
hopes of keeping the document from the other spy. Figure 4 specifies this situation.
Chance determines whether Spy 1 (f1) or Spy 2 (f2) arrives first. Then the two
spies either look (`) in the box or destroy (d) the bank.
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h¯
(a, a)a
(a, d)
d
(a)a
(d)
d
{}
Figure 5. An OR∗ choice-sequence form with absent-
mindedness. In accord with Proposition 4.1, R|N¯ is not injective
(consider (a) and (a, a)).
their order. Showing that this can be done, whenever there is no-
absent-mindedness, is the interesting part of the proposition’s proof.
Conversely, Proposition 4.1(a⇐b) shows that no-absent-mindedness
is necessary for injectivity. For example, consider Figure 5, which
replicates the classic example of absent-mindedness in Piccione and
Rubinstein (1997, Figure 1). Here R takes both the sequence (a) and
the sequence (a, a) to the set {a}. Thus, R|T¯ is not injective. The
proposition’s proof shows that something similar happens whenever
no-absent-mindedness is violated.
4.2. Converting choice-sequence forms to choice-set forms
The previous subsection concerned only OR∗ choice-sequence forms.
Yet Proposition 4.1(a⇒c) showed that the order explicitly specified in
choice sequences is redundant whenever no-absent-mindedness holds.
This suggests that every no-absent-minded OR∗ choice-sequence form
can be converted into an “equivalent” choice-set form.
The following theorem does so. In particular, part (a) shows how to
convert a no-absent-minded OR∗ choice-sequence form into a choice-set
form. Then the remaining parts of the theorem describe several senses
in which the original choice-sequence form and the new choice-set form
are “equivalent” to one another.
Theorem 1. Suppose ((Ci)i, N¯) is an OR
∗ choice-sequence form (6)
with no-absent-mindedness (16). Let N = R(N¯). Then
(a) ((Ci)i, N) is a choice-set form (14).
Further, derive C=∪iCi, T¯ (2), F¯ (3), T (9), F (10), and p (11). Then
the following hold.
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(b) R|N¯ is a bijection from N¯ onto N .
(c) R(T¯ ) = T .
(d) (∀t¯, c, t¯ ]) t¯⊕(c)=t¯ ] ⇔ ( c/∈R(t¯) and R(t¯)∪{c} = R(t¯ ]) ).
(e) F = { (R(t¯), c) | (t¯, c)∈F¯ }.
(f) p = { (R(t¯), R(1t¯L(t¯)−1)) | t¯6={} }. (Proof C.4.)
Since N = R(N¯) by definition, part (b) of the theorem merely re-
states Proposition 4.1(a⇒c). The remaining conclusions are natural
but not trivial.
In particular, part (a) shows that the axioms defining an OR∗ choice-
sequence form imply the axioms defining a choice-set form. Part (c)
relates the finite choice sequences in T¯ to the finite choice sets in T .
Then part (d) shows that nodes and choices play parallel roles in the
two formulations. Accordingly, concatenation in the context of choice
sequences corresponds to union in the context of choice sets. Part (e)
relates the feasibility correspondences of the two formulations. And
finally, part (f) relates the choice-set immediate-predecessor function p
to its choice-sequence counterpart.
4.3. Bijection
Theorem 1(a) allows us to define the operator R̂ that takes no-absent-
minded OR∗ choice-sequence forms to choice-set forms by the rule
R̂ : ((Ci)i, N¯) 7→ ((Ci)i, R(N¯)) .(17)
Proposition 4.1(a⇐b) shows that the domain of R̂ cannot be mean-
ingfully extended to include OR∗ choice-sequence forms with absent-
mindedness.
The following theorem establishes that R̂ is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between (1) the class of no-absent-minded OR∗ choice-sequence
forms and (2) the class of choice-set forms. This result and Theo-
rem 1(b–f) both support the claim that no-absent-minded OR∗ choice-
sequence forms are “equivalent” to choice-set forms.
Theorem 2. R̂ (17) is a bijection from the class of OR∗ choice-
sequence forms (6) with no-absent-mindedness (16) onto the class of
choice-set forms (14). (Proof D.3.)
Since Theorem 1(a) already showed that R̂ maps into the class of
choice-set forms, the proof of Theorem 2 must only show that R̂ is
injective and surjective.
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The proof of the injectivity of R̂ resembles the proof of the injectivity
of R|N¯ in Proposition 4.1(a⇒c). However, the argument here is at a
deeper level. There, an OR∗ choice-sequence form ((Ci)i, N¯) was taken
as given, and it was shown that R cannot take two choice sequences
in N¯ to the same choice set. In contrast, it is shown here that R̂
cannot take two OR∗ choice-sequence forms ((C1i )i, N¯
1) and ((C2i )i, N¯
2)
to the same choice-set form. So, at this deeper level as well, the order
explicitly specified in sequences is redundant.
To prove the surjectivity of R̂, I take an arbitrary choice-set form and
convert it into an OR∗ choice-sequence form. The proof’s most difficult
step shows that the infinite choice-set nodes correspond to the infinite
choice-sequence nodes. Another step shows that the axioms defining
a choice-set form imply the axioms defining an OR∗ choice-sequence
form. Throughout the entire proof, I lean heavily on Lemma B.6,
which shows that all choice-set forms implicitly satisfy a property that
resembles Lemma A.5(a)’s characterization of no-absent-mindedness
for OR∗ choice-sequence forms. This resemblance further reinforces the
notion that choice-set forms are “equivalent” to no-absent-minded OR∗
choice-sequence forms.
5. Corollaries
This section contains several results about choice-set forms. Al-
though these results are natural, they are nontrivial. All are proved
as corollaries of Theorems 1 and 2, and they appear here in the order
in which they are proved in Appendix E. All are used extensively by
Streufert (2015b).
Consider a choice-set form ((Ci)i, N). Say that one node n
1 precedes
another node n2 if n1 ⊂ n2. Equivalently, say that n2 succeeds n1.
Corollary 5.1(b) characterizes the predecessors of a finite node. Part
(a) is a useful intermediate result.
Corollary 5.1. Suppose ((Ci)i, N) is a choice-set form (14) with its
T (9) and p (11). Then the following hold.10
(a) t[ ⊂ t iff both |t[| < |t| and t[ = p|t|−|t[|(t).
(b) {t[|t[⊂t} is the chain {pj(t) | |t|≥j≥1}. (Proof E.1.)
10I use the superscript [ to suggest a predecessor, and the superscript ] to suggest
a successor.
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Let a terminal node be a node without successors. Corollary 5.2(c)
characterizes the nonterminal nodes. In particular, it shows that the
collection of nonterminal nodes equals the collection of finite nodes
with nonempty feasible sets. The latter is expressed as F−1(C), which
is the domain of the feasibility correspondence F . Parts (a) and (b)
are useful intermediate results. In particular, part (b) shows that one
infinite node cannot be included within another infinite node.
Corollary 5.2. Suppose ((Ci)i, N) is a choice-set form (14) with its
C=∪iCi, T (9), and F (10). Then the following hold.
(a) If t⊂n] then F (t)∩n] 6=∅.
(b) { n | (∃n])n⊂n] } ⊆ T .
(c) { n | (∃n])n⊂n] } = F−1(C). (Proof E.2.)
Corollary 5.3(b) characterizes the predecessors of an infinite node.
It does so by part (a), which shows that every infinite node is uniquely
associated with an infinite sequence of finite nodes.
Corollary 5.3. Suppose ((Ci)i, N) is a choice-set form (14) with its
T (9) and p (11). Take any n /∈ T . Then the following hold.
(a) There exists a unique (tk)k≥0 such that
n=∪{tk|k} , t0={} , and (∀k≥1) p(tk)=tk−1 .
(b) {n[|n[⊂n} is the infinite chain {tk|k}, where (tk)k≥0 is defined
in part (a). (Proof E.3.)
Finally, for any choice-set form ((Ci)i, N), define the binary operator
∧ on N by
(∀n1, n2) n1∧n2 := max{ m | m⊆n1∩n2 } ,(18)
where m denotes an arbitrary member of N . Corollary 5.4(a) shows
that ∧ is well-defined, and thus the partially ordered set (N,⊆) is a
sublattice with meet ∧. Further, Corollary 5.4(b) shows that the meet
of any two distinct nodes is finite.
Corollary 5.4. Suppose ((Ci)i, N) is a choice-set form (14). Derive
T (9) and ∧ (18). Take any n1 and n2. Then
(a) n1∧n2 is well-defined, and
(b) n1 6=n2 implies n1∧n2∈T . (Proof E.6.)
Appendix A. For choice-sequence forms only
A.1. The implicit specification of agents11
Lemma A.1.
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Suppose (C, N¯) satisfies (1a)–(1d) and derive its F¯
(3). Then (∀c) F¯−1(c) 6= ∅.
Proof. Derive T¯ (2). Take any c. By (1b), there exists n¯ such that
c ∈ R(n¯). Either (a) n¯ ∈ T¯ and n¯ itself is a t¯ such that c ∈ R(t¯), or (b)
n¯ /∈ T¯ and (1c) implies the existence of a t¯ such that c ∈ R(t¯). Hence in
either case, there exist t¯ and ` such that t¯` = c. Thus 1t¯`−1⊕(c) = 1t¯`,
which implies that (1t¯`−1, c) ∈ F¯ . 2
Lemma A.2. If F¯ ⊆ T¯×C, the following are equivalent.
(a) (∀c, c′) F¯−1(c)=F¯−1(c′) or F¯−1(c)∩F¯−1(c′)=∅.
(b) (∀t¯, t¯′) F¯ (t¯)=F¯ (t¯′) or F¯ (t¯)∩F¯ (t¯′)=∅.
Proof. By inspection, the following seven statements are equivalent.
(∃c, c′) F¯−1(c) 6= F¯−1(c′) and F¯−1(c)∩F¯−1(c′) 6= ∅.(19a)
(∃c1, c2) F¯−1(c2)rF¯−1(c1) 6= ∅ and F¯−1(c2)∩F¯−1(c1) 6= ∅.
(∃c1, c2, t¯ 1, t¯ 2) t¯ 1∈F¯−1(c2), t¯ 1 /∈F¯−1(c1), t¯ 2∈F¯−1(c2), and t¯ 2∈F¯−1(c1).
(∃c1, c2, t¯ 1, t¯ 2) (t¯ 1, c1)/∈F¯ and {(t¯ 1, c2), (t¯ 2, c1), (t¯ 2, c2)}⊆F¯ .
(∃c1, c2, t¯ 1, t¯ 2) c1∈F¯ (t¯ 2), c1 /∈F¯ (t¯ 1), c2∈F¯ (t¯ 2), and c2∈F¯ (t¯ 1).
(∃t¯ 1, t¯ 2) F¯ (t¯ 2)rF¯ (t¯ 1) 6= ∅ and F¯ (t¯ 2)∩F¯ (t¯ 1) 6= ∅.
(∃t¯, t¯′) F¯ (t¯) 6= F¯ (t¯′) and F¯ (t¯)∩F¯ (t¯′) 6= ∅.(19b)
(19a) is the negation of (a), and (19b) is the negation of (b). 2
Proof A.3 (for Lemma 2.1).
(a). To prove (5a), I must show that H¯ is a partition of F¯−1(C).
First, by the definition of H¯,
∪H¯ = ∪{F¯−1(c)|c} = F¯−1(C) .
Second, (1e) and Lemma A.2(b⇒a) imply that
(∀c, c′) F¯−1(c)=F¯−1(c′) or F¯−1(c)∩F¯−1(c′)=∅ .
11The agents of OR∗ choice-sequence forms are needed for the definition of
no-absent-mindedness (16). However, Lemma A.5 will characterize no-absent-
mindedness without the use of agents. Thereafter, the agents of OR∗ choice-sequence
forms play no role in the appendices. (The agents of choice-set forms appear briefly
in Appendix B.1.)
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Thus by the definition of H¯, the members of H¯ are disjoint. Third, by
Lemma A.1 and the definition of H¯, each member of H¯ is nonempty.
To prove (5b), suppose t¯ 1, t¯ 2, and h¯ satisfy {t¯ 1, t¯ 2} ⊆ h¯. By the
definition of H¯, there exists some c such that h¯ = F¯−1(c). Thus by
the next-to-last sentence, {t¯ 1, t¯ 2} ⊆ F¯−1(c). Hence c ∈ F¯ (t¯ 1)∩F¯ (t¯ 2).
Thus (1e) implies F¯ (t¯ 1) = F¯ (t¯ 2).
To prove the contrapositive of (5c), suppose F¯ (h¯1)∩F¯ (h¯2)6=∅. Then
there exists t¯ 1, t¯ 2, and c∗ such that
t¯ 1∈h¯1 , t¯ 2∈h¯2 ,(20a)
c∗∈F¯ (t¯ 1) and c∗∈F¯ (t¯ 2) .(20b)
(20b) implies that {t¯ 1, t¯ 2}⊆F¯−1(c∗). Thus by the definition of H¯, t¯ 1
and t¯ 2 belong to a common h¯. This, (20a), and the already proved fact
(5a) that H¯ is a partition, imply that both h¯1 and h¯2 equal h¯. Thus
h¯1 = h¯2.
(b). Assume H¯∗ satisfies (5).
This paragraph shows that (C, N¯) satisfies (1e). Accordingly, take
any t¯ and t¯′. Either there exists an h¯∈H¯∗ containing both t¯ and t¯′ or
there does not. In the first case, (5b) for H¯∗ implies that F¯ (t¯)=F¯ (t¯′).
In the second case, (5a) for H¯∗ implies the existence of {h¯, h¯′}⊆H¯∗
such that h¯6=h¯′, h¯3t¯, and h¯′3t¯′. Here h¯6=h¯′ and (5c) for H¯∗ imply
F¯ (h¯)∩F¯ (h¯′)=∅. Thus h¯3t¯ and h¯′3t¯′ imply F¯ (t¯)∩F¯ (t¯′)=∅.
Since the previous paragraph established (1e), part (a) implies that
the H¯ defined by (4) satisfies (5). Similarly, the H¯∗ assumed by this
part (b) satisfies (5) by definition. Thus we can show that H¯∗ = H¯ by
showing that no more than one partition of F¯−1(C) can satisfy (5b)
and (5c).
Accordingly, suppose that H¯1 and H¯2 are two distinct partitions
of F¯−1(C) that satisfy (5b) and (5c). Then H¯1rH¯2 or H¯2rH¯1 is
nonempty. Without loss of generality, assume the former and take
h¯1∈H¯1rH¯2. Since H¯1 is a partition, h¯1 is nonempty and thus we may
take t¯∈h¯1. Further, since H¯2 is a partition, there is an h¯2∈H¯2 such
that t¯∈h¯2. Since h¯1∈H¯1rH¯2, it must be that h¯1 6=h¯2. Also note that
t¯ ∈ h¯1∩h¯2 by the definitions of t¯ and h¯2.
This paragraph shows that having h¯1 6=h¯2 and t¯∈h¯1∩h¯2 leads to a con-
tradiction. Since h¯1 6=h¯2, it must be that h¯1rh¯2 or h¯2rh¯1 is nonempty.
Without loss of generality, suppose the former and take t¯ 1∈h¯1rh¯2.
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Since (a) t¯∈h¯2, (b) t¯ 1 /∈h¯2, and (c) H¯2 is a partition, t¯ and t¯1 belong to
different members of the partition H¯2. Hence (5c) for H¯2 implies that
F¯ (t¯)∩F¯ (t¯ 1)=∅. Yet, since h¯1 contains both t¯ and t¯ 1, (5b) for H¯1 im-
plies that F¯ (t¯)=F¯ (t¯ 1). Further, F¯ (t¯) is nonempty since t¯∈h¯1⊆F¯−1(C),
where the set inclusion holds because H¯1 partitions F¯−1(C). The last
three sentences are logically inconsistent. 2
Proof A.4 (for Lemma 2.2).
(a). Note
∪{H¯i|i}
= ∪{ {F¯−1(c)|c∈Ci} |i}
= {F¯−1(c)|c∈∪iCi}
= {F¯−1(c)|c}
= H¯ ,
where the first equality holds by the definition of (H¯i)i, the third holds
by the definition of C, and the fourth is the definition of H¯.
It remains to be shown that the members of (H¯i)i are disjoint. Ac-
cordingly, suppose that H¯i1∩H¯i2 6= ∅. Then by the definition of (H¯i)i,
there exists c1 ∈ Ci1 and c2 ∈ Ci2 such that F¯−1(c1) = F¯−1(c2). Thus
by Lemma A.1, there exists t¯ such that
(t¯, c1) ∈ F¯ and(21a)
(t¯, c2) ∈ F¯ .(21b)
(21a), the definition of c1, and (6c) together imply F¯ (t¯) ⊆ Ci1 . Sim-
ilarly, (21b), the definition of c2, and (6c) imply F¯ (t¯) ⊆ Ci2 . Since
F¯ (t¯) 6= ∅ by (21a), the last two sentences imply Ci1∩Ci2 6= ∅. This
violates (6b).
(b). Note
∪{∪H¯i|i}
= ∪{∪{F¯−1(c)|c∈Ci}|i}
= ∪{F¯−1(Ci)|i}
= F¯−1(∪iCi)
= F¯−1(C) ,
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where the first equality holds by the definition of (H¯i)i, and the last
holds by the definition of C.
It remains to be shown that the members of {∪H¯i|i} are disjoint.
Accordingly, suppose that (∪H¯i1)∩(∪H¯i2) 6= ∅. Then by the definition
of (H¯i)i
(∪{F¯−1(c1)|c1∈Ci1}) ∩ (∪{F¯−1(c2)|c2∈Ci2}) 6= ∅ .
Thus there exists t¯, c1∈Ci1 , and c2∈Ci2 , such that t¯ ∈ F¯−1(c1)∪F¯−1(c2).
Hence
(t¯, c1) ∈ F¯ and(22a)
(t¯, c2) ∈ F¯ .(22b)
(22a), the definition of c1, and (6c) together imply F¯ (t¯) ⊆ Ci1 . Sim-
ilarly, (22b), the definition of c2, and (6c) imply F¯ (t¯) ⊆ Ci2 . Since
F¯ (t¯) 6= ∅ by (22a), the last two sentences imply Ci1∩Ci2 6= ∅. This
violates (6b). 2
A.2. Preliminary results for theorems
Lemma A.5. Suppose ((Ci)i, N¯) is an OR
∗ choice-sequence form (6)
with its T¯ (2) and F¯ (3). Then each of the following is equivalent to
no-absent-mindedness (16).
(a) (∀t¯)(∀n¯) |{ ` | n¯`∈F¯ (t¯) }| ≤ 1.
(b) (∀t¯) |R(t¯)| = L(t¯).
Proof. Define H¯ by (4). Since the negation of no-absent-mindedness
is (23), since the negation of (a) is (24), and since the negation of (b)
is (25) because |R(t¯)| > L(t¯) is inconceivable, it suffices to show the
equivalence of
(∃h¯)(∃t¯)(∃0≤k<L(t¯)) {1t¯k, t¯}⊆h¯ ,(23)
(∃t¯)(∃n¯) |{ ` | n¯`∈F¯ (t¯) }| ≥ 2 , and(24)
(∃t¯) |R(t¯)| < L(t¯) .(25)
(23) implies (24). Let h¯, t¯, and 0≤ k <L(t¯) be such that {1t¯k, t¯}⊆ h¯.
Since k <L(t¯), t¯k+1 exists and satisfies
t¯k+1 ∈ F¯ (1t¯k) .(26)
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Thus, by {1t¯k, t¯}⊆ h¯, and by (5b) of Lemma 2.1(a), we have t¯k+1 ∈ F¯ (t¯).
Thus we may construct n¯ = t¯⊕(t¯k+1). Then
|{ ` | n¯`∈F¯ (1t¯k) }| ≥ |{ ` | n¯`=t¯k+1 }| ≥ |{ k+1, L(t¯)+1 }| = 2 ,
where the first inequality holds by (26), the second inequality holds by
the construction of n¯, and the equality holds by k < L(t¯).
(24) implies (25). Let t¯ and n¯ such that |{ ` | n¯`∈F¯ (t¯) }| ≥ 2. Then
there exist k and ` such that k < ` and {n¯k, n¯`} ⊆ F¯ (t¯). Thus
t¯ ∈ F¯−1(n¯k) ∩ F¯−1(n¯`) .(27)
By the definition of H¯, both of these inverse images are agents. Hence
by (27), and by (5a) of Lemma 2.1(a),
F¯−1(n¯k) = F¯−1(n¯`)
Thus, since 1n¯`−1 ∈ F¯−1(n¯`), we have 1n¯`−1 ∈ F¯−1(n¯k). In other words,
we have n¯k ∈ F¯ (1n¯`−1). Hence we may construct t¯∗ = 1n¯`−1⊕(n¯k).
Since k < `, t¯∗k is well-defined and equals n¯k. Since both t¯
∗
k and t¯
∗
`
equal n¯k, |R(t¯∗)| < L(t¯∗).
(25) implies (23). Let t¯ be such that |R(t¯)| < L(t¯). Then there are
k and ` such that 1 ≤ k < ` and t¯k = t¯`. Since 1t¯k−1 ∈ F¯−1(t¯k), since
1t¯`−1 ∈ F¯−1(t¯`), and since t¯k = t¯`, we have
{1t¯k−1, 1t¯`−1} ⊆ F¯−1(t¯k) .(28)
By the definition of H¯, let h¯ = F¯−1(t¯k). Then (28) implies
{1t¯k−1, 1t¯`−1} ⊆ h¯ .(29)
Further, let t¯∗ = 1t¯`−1. Then 1 ≤ k < ` and (29) imply
0 ≤ k−1 < `−1 = L(t¯∗) and
{1t¯ ∗k−1, t¯∗} ⊆ h¯ .
2
Proof A.6 (for Proposition 4.1). It suffices to prove the equivalence
of
((Ci)i, N¯) has absent-mindedness ,(30)
(∃t¯1, t¯2) t¯1 6=t¯2 and R(t¯1)=R(t¯2) , and(31)
(∃n¯1, n¯2) n¯1 6=n¯2 and R(n¯1)=R(n¯2) .(32)
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(30) implies (31). Suppose ((Ci)i, N¯) has absent-mindedness. Then
Lemma A.5(b) implies the existence of a sequence t¯ such that |R(t¯)| <
L(t¯). Thus there exist indices 1 ≤ k < ` ≤ L(t¯) such that t¯k = t¯`.
Hence R(1t¯`−1) = R(1t¯`).
(31) implies (32). This is obvious since T¯ ⊆ N¯ .
(32) implies (30). Assume that n¯1 and n¯2 are distinct elements of N¯
such that R(n¯1) = R(n¯2). Define
K 6= = { 1≤` | n¯1` 6= n¯2` ,
`≤L(n¯1) if n¯1 is finite,
`≤L(n¯2) if n¯2 is finite } .
On the one hand, suppose K 6= is empty. Then the distinctness of
n¯1 and n¯2 implies that one is a subsequence (Section 2.1) of the other.
Without loss of generality, suppose n¯1 is a subsequence of n¯2. Hence
n¯1 is finite,
n¯1 = 1n¯
2
L(n¯1) , and(33a)
( L(n¯1)<L(n¯2) or n¯2 is infinite ) .(33b)
By (33b), n¯2L(n¯1)+1 exists and is an element of R(n¯
2). Thus since
R(n¯1) = R(n¯2) by assumption, there exists some k ≤ L(n¯1) such that
n¯1k = n¯
2
L(n¯1)+1. Thus by (33a), n¯
2
k = n¯
2
L(n¯1)+1. So, since k ≤ L(n¯1),
both the k-th component and the last component of 1n¯
2
L(n¯1)+1 equal n
2
k.
Hence |R(1n¯ 2L(n¯1)+1)| < L(1n¯ 2L(n¯1)+1). This inequality implies absent-
mindedness by Lemma A.5(b).
On the other hand, suppose K 6= is nonempty. Define k = minK 6=.
Then
n¯1k 6= n¯2k and(34a)
1n¯
1
k−1 = 1n¯
2
k−1 .(34b)
Since n¯1k ∈ F¯ (1n¯ 1k−1) and n¯2k ∈ F¯ (1n¯ 2k−1), (34b) implies
{n¯1k, n¯2k} ⊆ F¯ (1n¯ 1k−1) .(35)
Further, (34a) and R(n¯1) = R(n¯2) imply the existence of some k′ 6= k
such that n¯1k′ = n¯
2
k. Thus by (35),
{n¯1k, n¯1k′} ⊆ F¯ (1n¯ 1k−1) .
This and k′ 6= k imply absent-mindedness by Lemma A.5(a) at t¯ =
1n¯
1
k−1. 2
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Lemma A.7 (The “zipper” lemma).12 Suppose ((Ci)i, N¯) is an OR
∗
choice-sequence form (6) with no-absent-mindedness (16). Derive its
T¯ by (2). Then10
(∀t¯ [, t¯) R(t¯ [) ⊆ R(t¯) ⇒ [ L(t¯ [) ≤ L(t¯) and t¯ [ = 1t¯L(t¯ [) ] .
Proof. Take any t¯ [ and t¯ such that R(t¯ [) ⊆ R(t¯). By Lemma A.5(b),
by R(t¯ [) ⊆ R(t¯), and by Lemma A.5(b) again, we have
L(t¯ [) = |R(t¯ [)| ≤ |R(t¯)| = L(t¯) .
This is the first of the lemma’s two conclusions. The next two para-
graphs will show by induction on `∈{1, 2, ... L(t¯ [)} that (∀`≤L(t¯ [))
1t¯
[
` = 1t¯`.
For the initial step at n = 1, suppose that t¯ [1 6= t¯1. Note that
{t¯ [1, t¯1} ⊆ F¯ ({}). Since R(t¯ [) ⊆ R(t¯), it must be that t¯ [1 ∈ R(t¯), and
hence there exists a k > 1 such that t¯ [1 = t¯k. The last two sen-
tences imply that there exists a k > 1 such that {t¯k, t¯1} ⊆ F¯ ({}).
By Lemma A.5(a) at its n¯ equal to the t¯ here, this contradicts no-
absent-mindedness.
For the inductive step at ` ∈ {2, 3, ...L(t¯ [)}, assume that 1t¯ [`−1 =
1t¯`−1 and suppose that t¯ [` 6= t¯`. The equality implies that {t¯ [` , t¯`} ⊆
F¯ (1t¯`−1). Also, since R(t¯ [) ⊆ R(t¯), it must be that t¯ [` ∈ R(t¯), and
hence there exists a k 6= ` such that t¯ [` = t¯k. The last two sen-
tences imply that there exists a k 6= ` such that {t¯k, t¯`} ⊆ F¯ (1t¯`−1).
By Lemma A.5(a) at its n¯ equal to the t¯ here, this contradicts no-
absent-mindedness.
Therefore (∀`≤L(t¯ [)) 1t¯ [` = 1t¯`. In particular, at ` = L(t¯ [), we have
1t¯
[
L(t¯ [)
= 1t¯L(t¯ [). The left-hand side is t¯
[. 2
Appendix B. For choice-set forms only
B.1. The implicit specification of agents
This Appendix B.1 can stand alone, without referring to any other
appendix. Further, no appendix refers to it.
Lemma B.1. Suppose that (C,N) is a choice-set preform (8) with
its F (10). Then (∀c) F−1(c) 6= ∅.
12The lemma’s two sequences are like the two sides of an unusual zipper whose
sides may have different lengths. The lemma’s inductive proof starts with the
sequences’ first choices and works its way up. Lemma E.4(a,c) extends this lemma
to accommodate infinite sequences.
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Proof. Derive T (9) and p (11). Then take any c. By (8b), there
exists n such that c ∈ n. Further, there exists t such that c ∈ t because
either (a) n ∈ T and n itself is a t such that c ∈ t, or (b) n /∈ T and
(8c) implies the existence of a t such that c ∈ t. Hence by the definition
of p, there exists a j such that |t| ≥ j ≥ 1, c /∈ pj(t), and pj(t)∩{c} =
pj−1(t). Hence (pj(t), c) ∈ F . 2
Lemma B.2. If F ⊆ T×C, the following are equivalent.
(a) (∀c, c′) F−1(c)=F−1(c′) or F−1(c)∩F−1(c′)=∅.
(b) (∀t, t′) F (t)=F (t′) or F (t)∩F (t′)=∅.
Proof. This proof is directly analogous to that of Lemma A.2. Re-
place T¯ with T , and F¯ with F . 2
Proof B.3 (for Lemma 3.1).
This proof is directly analogous to Proof A.3 for Lemma 2.1. Replace
T¯ with T , F¯ with F , H¯ with H, (1) with (8), (4) with (12), (5) with
(13), Lemma A.1 with Lemma B.1, and Lemma A.2 with Lemma B.2.
2
Proof B.4 (for Lemma 3.2).
This proof is directly analogous to Proof A.4 for Lemma 2.2. Replace
T¯ with T , F¯ with F , H¯ with H, (6) with (14), and Lemma A.1 with
Lemma B.1. 2
B.2. Preliminary results for theorems
Lemma B.5. If (C,N) is a choice-set preform (8), then {}∈N .
Proof. Define T by (9). By (8a), there is an n. Thus there is a t
because (1) if n ∈ T then n itself is a t, and (2) if n /∈ T then (8c)
implies the existence of a t ⊂ n. If t = {}, we are done because T ⊆ N
by the definition of N . If not,
{} = p|t|(t) ∈ T ⊆ N ,
where the equality and set membership both follow from (8d) and the
definition of p, and where the set inclusion follows from the definition
of T . 2
26 Appendix B
Lemma B.6. Suppose that (C,N) is a choice-set preform (8) and
derive its T (9) and F (10). Then (∀t)(∀n) |F (t)∩n| ≤ 1.13
Proof. Take any to and no, and suppose that c1 and c2 are distinct
elements of F (to)∩no.
This paragraph defines t such that {c1, c2} ⊆ t. On the one hand,
if no ∈ T , let t = no. On the other hand, if no /∈ T , (8c) implies the
existence of an infinite chain T ∗ such that ∪T ∗ = no. Since {c1, c2} is
finite, there is a t ∈ T ∗ such that {c1, c2} ⊆ t.
Now define
t2 := min { pj(t) | |t|≥j≥0 and {c1, c2}⊆pj(t) } ,
where p0(t) := t (the set contains at least p0(t) by the definition of t).
Note that t2rp(t2) is a singleton containing either c1 or c2. Without
loss of generality, assume t2rp(t2) = {c2}. Note that
c1 ∈ p(t2) and(36a)
c2 ∈ F (p(t2)) .(36b)
By the first paragraph and (36b), c2 is an element of both F (to) and
F (p(t2)). Thus by (8e), F (to) = F (p(t2)). Thus since c1 ∈ F (to) by
the first paragraph, c1 ∈ F (p(t2)). This, (36a), and the definition of F
contradict one another. 2
Lemma B.7. Suppose that (C,N) satisfies (8a) and derive its T by
(9). Then for any s ⊆ C,
(∃T ∗) T ∗ is an infinite chain in T and ∪T ∗=s .
⇔ (∃(tk)k≥1) (∀k)tk⊂tk+1 and ∪ktk=s .
Proof. The ⇐ direction is proved by setting T ∗ = {tk|k}.
To prove the ⇒ direction, take any s and assume T ∗ is an infinite
chain in T such that ∪T ∗= s. By the definition of T , T ∗ is a chain
of finite sets. Thus any nonempty subcollection of T ∗ has a minimum.
Accordingly, define (tk)k≥1 recursively by t1 = minT ∗ and (∀k≥2) tk =
minT ∗r{t1, t2,...tk−1}. Note that
(∀k≥1) tk ⊂ tk+1 .(37)
13The property here resembles that of Lemma A.5(a). Accordingly, the property
here can be loosely regarded as the “no-absent-mindedness” that is implicit in a
choice-set form.
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Thus it remains to show ∪ktk = s. Note that ∪ktk ⊆ ∪T ∗ = s, because
the set inclusion holds by (∀k) tk ∈ T ∗ and because the equality holds
by assumption. Conversely, the next two paragraphs show s ⊆ ∪ktk.
This paragraph shows by induction that
(∀k≥1) k−1 ≤ |tk| .(38)
The initial step at k=1 is 0 ≤ |t1|, which holds trivially. Now take any
k≥1 and assume k−1 ≤ |tk| . Then
k = (k−1)+1 ≤ |tk|+1 ≤ |tk+1| ,
where the first inequality holds by the inductive hypothesis and the
second inequality holds by (37).
Finally take any c ∈ s. Since s = ∪T ∗ by assumption, there exists
some u ∈ T ∗ such that c ∈ u. Because T ∗ is a chain and (∀k) tk∈T ∗,
either u ⊆ t|u|+1 or u ⊃ t|u|+1. The latter would imply |u| > |t|u|+1|,
which is equivalent to k−1 > |tk| for k = |u|+1. Since this would con-
tradict (38), it must be that u ⊆ t|u|+1. Hence c ∈ u ⊆ t|u|+1 ⊆ ∪ktk.
2
Appendix C. For Theorem 1
Lemma C.1.14 Take any (Ci)i. Suppose
(i) N¯ is a nonempty collection of sequences in C,
(ii) N is a nonempty collection of subsets of C,
(iii) R|T¯ is a bijection from T¯ onto T , and
(iv) (∀t¯, c, t¯ ]) t¯⊕(c)=t¯ ] ⇔ ( c/∈R(t¯) and R(t¯)∪{c}=R(t¯ ]) ),
where C is defined by ∪iCi, T¯ by (2), and T by (9). Then the following
hold.
(a) F = { (R(t¯), c) | (t¯, c)∈F¯ }, where F¯ is defined by (3) and F is
defined by (10).
(b) p = { (R(t¯), R(1t¯L(t¯)−1)) | t¯6={} }, where p is defined by (11).
(c) (1e) is equivalent to (8e).
(d) (6c) is equivalent to (14c).
Proof. (a). Take any t¯ and any c. Then
(R(t¯), c) ∈ F
⇔ c/∈R(t¯) and R(t¯)∪{c}∈T
14This lemma has an unusual appearance because it is used in both Appendix C
and Appendix D.
28 Appendix C
⇔ (∃t]) c/∈R(t¯) and R(t¯)∪{c}=t]
⇔ (∃t¯]) c/∈R(t¯) and R(t¯)∪{c}=R(t¯])
⇔ (∃t¯]) t¯⊕(c) = t¯]
⇔ t¯⊕(c) ∈ T¯
⇔ (t¯, c) ∈ F¯ ,
where the first equivalence is the definition of F , the third follows
from (iii), the fourth follows from (iv), and the sixth follows from the
definition of F¯ .
(b). I argue
p = { (t, tr{c}) | c∈t and tr{c}∈T }
= { (t, tr{c}) | (∃t[) c∈t and tr{c}=t[ }
= { (t, t[) | (∃c) c∈t and tr{c}=t[ }
= { (t, t[) | (∃c) c/∈t[ and t[∪{c}=t }
= { (R(t¯), R(t¯[)) | (∃c) c/∈R(t¯[) and R(t¯[)∪{c}=R(t¯) }
= { (R(t¯), R(t¯[)) | (∃c) t¯[⊕(c)=t¯ }
= { (R(t¯), R(t¯[)) | t¯ 6={} and t¯[=1t¯L(t¯)−1 }
= { (R(t¯), R(1t¯L(t¯)−1)) | t¯6={} } .
The first equality is the definition of p. The fifth equality holds by (iii).
The sixth equality holds by (iv).
(c). I argue that
(1e)
⇔ (∀t¯ 1, t¯ 2) F¯ (t¯ 1)=F¯ (t¯ 2) or F¯ (t¯ 1)∩F¯ (t¯ 2)6=∅
⇔ (∀t¯ 1, t¯ 2) F◦R(t¯ 1)=F◦R(t¯ 2) or F◦R(t¯ 1)∩F◦R(t¯ 2)6=∅
⇔ (∀t1, t2) F (t1)=F (t2) or F (t1)∩F (t2)6=∅
⇔ (8e) .
The second equivalence holds by part (a), and the third equivalence
holds by (iii).
(d). Take any i. I argue that
(6c) at i
⇔ (∀t¯) F¯ (t¯)⊆Ci or F¯ (t¯)∩Ci=∅
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⇔ (∀t¯) F◦R(t¯)⊆Ci or F◦R(t¯)∩Ci=∅
⇔ (∀t) F (t)⊆Ci or F (t)∩Ci=∅
⇔ (14c) at i .
The second equivalence holds by part (a), and the third equivalence
holds by (iii). 2
Lemma C.2. Suppose ((Ci)i, N¯) is an OR
∗ choice-sequence form
(6) with no-absent-mindedness (16). Let N = R(N¯). Further, derive
C=∪iCi, T¯ (2), F¯ (3), T (9), F (10), and p (11). Then the following
hold.
(a) N is a nonempty collection of subsets of C.
(b) R|N¯ is a bijection from N¯ onto N .
(c) R(T¯ ) = T .
(d) (∀t¯, c, t¯ ]) t¯⊕(c)=t¯ ] ⇔ ( c/∈R(t¯) and R(t¯)∪{c} = R(t¯ ]) ).
(e) F = { (R(t¯), c) | (t¯, c)∈F¯ }.
(f) p = { (R(t¯), R(1t¯L(t¯)−1)) | t¯6={} }.
Proof. (a). N is a nonempty collection of subsets of C because (1)
N = R(N¯) by definition and (2) N¯ is a nonempty collection of se-
quences in C by (1a).
(b). Since N = R(N¯) by definition, R|N¯ is onto N . Injectivity
follows from Proposition 4.1(a⇒c).
(c). To show the ⊆ direction, take any t¯. By the definition of N ,
R(t¯) ∈ N . Further, |R(t¯)| ≤ L(t¯). By the last two sentences, R(t¯) ∈ T .
To show the ⊇ direction, take any t. By the definition of N , there ex-
ists n¯ such that R(n¯) = t. It remains to show that n¯ ∈ T¯ . Accordingly,
suppose n¯ /∈ T¯ . Then (1c) would imply (∀`≥1) 1n¯` ∈ T¯ . Hence
(∀`≥1) |R(n¯)| ≥ |R(1n¯`)| = L(1n¯`) = ` ,(39)
where the first equality holds by Lemma A.5(b). (39) implies that
|R(n¯)| is infinite. This contradicts that (a) |t| is finite by the definition
of T and (b) |R(n¯)| = |t| by the definition of n¯.
(d). This paragraph shows
(∀t¯ [, c, t¯) t¯ [⊕(c)=t¯ ⇒ c/∈R(t¯ [) and R(t¯ [)∪{c}=R(t¯) .
Accordingly, take any t¯ [, c, and t¯ such that t¯ [⊕(c) = t¯. Note that
t¯ [⊕(c) = t¯ implies that R(t¯ [)∪{c} = R(t¯ [⊕(c)) = R(t¯), which is the
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second fact to be derived. Also note that
|R(t¯ [)|+ 1 = L(t¯ [) + 1 = L(t¯) = |R(t¯)|
by Lemma A.5(b), by t¯ [⊕(c) = t¯, and by Lemma A.5(b) again. This
and t¯ [⊕(c) = t¯ yield c /∈ R(t¯ [), which is the first fact to be derived.
Conversely, this paragraph shows
(∀t¯ [, c, t¯) t¯ [⊕(c)=t¯ ⇐ c/∈R(t¯ [) and R(t¯ [)∪{c}=R(t¯) .
Accordingly, take any t¯ [, c, and t¯ such that c /∈ R(t¯ [) and R(t¯ [)∪{c} =
R(t¯). Note
L(t¯ [) + 1 = |R(t¯ [)|+ 1 = |R(t¯)| = L(t¯).
by Lemma A.5(b), by the assumption of the previous sentence, and by
Lemma A.5(b) again. So, trivially, L(t¯ [) = L(t¯)−1. Since R(t¯ [) ⊆
R(t¯ [)∪{c} = R(t¯), the “zipper” Lemma A.7 shows that t¯ [ = 1t¯L(t¯ [).
So the last two sentences yield t¯ [ = 1t¯L(t¯)−1. Therefore, since {c} =
R(t¯)∼R(t¯ [) by assumption, it must be that t¯L(t¯) = c. The last two
sentences yield t¯ [⊕(c) = t¯.
(e,f). This paragraph argues that the assumptions of Lemma C.1
hold. (1a) implies (i). Part (a) implies (ii). Parts (b) and (c) imply
(iii). And finally, part (d) implies (iv).
Consequently, Lemma C.1(a) implies part (e), and Lemma C.1(b)
implies part (f). 2
Lemma C.3. Suppose ((Ci)i, N¯) is an OR
∗ choice-sequence form (6)
with no-absent-mindedness (16). Let N = N¯ . Then the following hold.
(a) (∪iCi, N) is a choice-set preform (8).
(b) ((Ci)i, N) is a choice-set form (14).
Proof. (a). (8a). This follows from Lemma C.2(a).
(8b). C ⊆ ∪R(N¯) = ∪N because the set inclusion holds by (1b) and
because the equality holds by the definition of N .
(8c). To prove the ⊆ direction, take any n /∈ T . By the definition of
N , we may define n¯ to satisfy n = R(n¯). Since n /∈ T , n¯ /∈ T¯ simply
because a finite sequence cannot have an infinite range. Hence, by
(1c), we may define T ∗ = {R(1n¯`)|`≥1}. T ∗⊆T simply because finite
sequences have finite ranges. Further, T ∗ is an infinite chain because
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(∀`) |R(1n¯`)| = ` by Lemma A.5(b). Finally,
n = R(n¯) = R(∪{1n¯`|`}) = ∪{R(1n¯`)|`} = ∪T ∗ ,
where the first equality is the definition of n¯, the second equality fol-
lows from n¯ being an infinite sequence, the third equality holds by
manipulation, and the last equality follows from the definition of T ∗.
To prove the ⊇ direction, let T ∗ be an infinite chain in T . Because
T ∗ is an infinite chain, ∪T ∗ must be an infinite set. Thus, it remains
to be shown that ∪T ∗ ∈ N .
By Lemma B.7, there exists (tk)k≥1 such that (∀k) tk ⊂ tk+1 and
∪ktk = ∪T ∗. Then by Lemma C.2(c), there exists (t¯ k)k≥1 such that
(∀k) tk = R(t¯ k). The last two sentences imply (∀k) R(t¯ k) ⊂ R(t¯ k+1).
This strict set inclusion has two implications. First, by two applications
of Lemma A.5(b), we have
(∀k) L(t¯ k) = |R(t¯ k)| < |R(t¯ k+1)| = L(t¯ k+1) .(40)
Second, by the zipper Lemma A.7, we have
(∀k) t¯ k = 1t¯ k+1L(tk) .(41)
(40) and (41) together imply that ∪k t¯k is an infinite sequence. (It need
not be the case that (∀k) L(t¯k)+1 = L(t¯k+1).)
For notational ease, define s¯ = ∪k t¯k. The remainder of this para-
graph shows
(∀`≥1) 1s¯` ∈ T¯ .(42)
Take any `. By (40), (41), and the definition of s¯, there exists some
k such that 1s¯` = 1t¯
k
` . Hence L(t¯
k)−` applications of (1d) yield that
1s¯` = 1t¯
k
` is in T¯ .
To conclude, this paragraph argues
∪T ∗ = ∪ktk = ∪kR(t¯k) = R(∪k t¯k) = R(s¯) ∈ N .
The first equality holds by the definition of (tk)k. The second equality
holds by the definition of (t¯k)k. The third equality holds by manipula-
tion. The fourth equality holds by the definition of s¯. To see the set
membership, note that (42) and assumption (1c) imply that s¯ ∈ N¯ .
Thus R(s¯) ∈ N by the definition of N .
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(8d). Take any t 6= ∅. Note that (R|T¯ )−1(t) is a well-defined se-
quence in T¯ by Lemma C.2(b,c).
This paragraph argues that
(∀c) c = [(R|T¯ )−1(t)]L((R|T¯ )−1(t))
⇔ (∃t¯ [) t¯ [⊕(c) = (R|T¯ )−1(t)
⇔ (∃t[) (R|T¯ )−1(t[)⊕(c) = (R|T¯ )−1(t)
⇔ (∃t[) c/∈R◦(R|T¯ )−1(t[) and R◦(R|T¯ )−1(t[)∪{c}=R◦(R|T¯ )−1(t)
⇔ (∃t[) c/∈t[ and t[∪{c}=t
⇔ (∃t[) c∈t and tr{c}=t[
⇔ c∈t and tr{c}∈T .
The first equivalence holds by inspection. The second equivalence holds
by Lemma C.2(b,c). The third equivalence holds by Lemma C.2(d) at
t¯=(R|T¯ )−1(t[) and t¯ ]=(R|T¯ )−1(t). The remaining equivalences hold by
manipulation.
The previous paragraph has established that the last elements of the
sequence (R|T¯ )−1(t) are identical to the last choices of the set t. Since
the sequence (R|T¯ )−1(t) belongs to T¯r{{}} by t6={}, the sequence has
a unique last element. Thus by the last two sentences, the set t has a
unique last choice.
(8e). This paragraph argues that the assumptions of Lemma C.1
hold. (1a) implies (i). Lemma C.2(a) implies (ii). Lemma C.2(b–c)
imply (iii). And finally, Lemma C.2(d) implies (iv).
Thus by Lemma C.1(c), (8e) is equivalent to assumption (1e).
(b). (14a). This is identical to part (a).
(14b). This is identical to assumption (6b).
(14c). The assumptions of Lemma C.1 hold by the first paragraph
in the above argument for (8e). Thus by Lemma C.1(d), (14c) is equiv-
alent to assumption (6c). 2
Proof C.4 (for Theorem 1).
Part (a) follows from Lemma C.3(b). The remaining parts of the
theorem follow from Lemma C.2(b–f). 2
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Appendix D. For Theorem 2
Lemma D.1. R̂ (17) is injective.
Proof. Suppose (a) that ((C1i )i, N¯
1) and ((C2i )i, N¯
2) are two OR∗
choice-sequence forms (6) with no-absent-mindedness (16), and (b) that
R̂ takes them both to the choice-set form (14) ((Ci)i, N). Then by the
definition of R̂ we have
(C1i )i = (C
2
i )i = (Ci)i and(43a)
R(N¯1) = R(N¯2) = N .(43b)
Since (43a) assures (C1i )i = (C
2
i )i, it remains to show that N¯
1 = N¯2.
Given (43a), I will henceforth replace (C1i )i and (C
2
i )i with (Ci)i.
Derive from ((Ci)i, N¯
1) its T¯ 1 (2) and F¯ 1 (3). Derive from ((Ci)i, N¯
2)
its T¯ 2 (2) and F¯ 2 (3). Derive from ((Ci)i, N) its T (9) and F (10). Set
C = ∪iCi. Note that the conclusions of Theorem 1 are available for
both ((Ci), N¯
1) and ((Ci)i, N¯
2).
Suppose N¯1 6= N¯2. By Theorem 1(b) and (43b), R|N¯1 is a bijection
from N¯1 onto N . Similarly, R|N¯2 is a bijection from N¯2 onto N . Thus
N¯1 6= N¯2 implies the existence of distinct n¯1 and n¯2 such that R(n¯1) =
R(n¯2). Define
K 6= = { 1≤` | n¯1` 6= n¯2` ,
`≤L(n¯1) if n¯1 is finite,
`≤L(n¯2) if n¯2 is finite } .
On the one hand, suppose K 6= is empty. Then the distinctness of
n¯1 and n¯2 implies that one is a subsequence (Section 2.1) of the other.
Without loss of generality, suppose n¯1 is a subsequence of n¯2. Hence
n¯1 is finite,
n¯1 = 1n¯
2
L(n¯1) , and(44a)
( L(n¯1)<L(n¯2) or n¯2 is infinite ) .(44b)
By (44b), n¯2L(n¯1)+1 is a well-defined element of R(n¯
2). Thus since
R(n¯1) = R(n¯2), there exists some k ≤ L(n¯1) such that n¯1k = n¯2L(n¯1)+1.
Thus by (44a), n¯2k = n¯
2
L(n¯1)+1. Hence, since k ≤ L(n¯1), both the
k-th component and the last component of 1n¯
2
L(n¯1)+1 equal n¯
2
k. So
|R(1n¯ 2L(n¯1)+1)| < L(1n¯ 2L(n¯1)+1). This inequality contradicts the no-
absent-mindedness of ((Ci)i, N¯
2) by Lemma A.5(b).
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On the other hand, suppose K 6= is nonempty. Let k = minK 6=. Then
n¯1k 6= n¯2k and(45a)
1n¯
1
k−1 = 1n¯
2
k−1 ,(45b)
where the last equality holds even if k = 1 because then both 1n¯
1
0 and
1n¯
2
0 equal {}. Note
n¯1k ∈ F¯ 1(1n¯ 1k−1) and(46a)
n¯2k ∈ F¯ 2(1n¯ 2k−1)(46b)
(F¯ 1 and F¯ 2 need not be equal).
Let t = R(1n¯
1
k−1). By (46a), by Theorem 1(e) for ((Ci)i, N¯
1), and by
the definition of t, we have
n¯1k ∈ F¯ 1(1n¯1k−1) = F (R(1n¯1k−1)) = F (t) .
Similarly, by (46b), by Theorem 1(e) for ((Ci)i, N¯
2), by (45b), and by
the definition of t, we have
n¯2k ∈ F¯ 2(1n¯2k−1) = F (R(1n¯2k−1)) = F (R(1n¯1k−1)) = F (t) .
These two together imply {n¯1k, n¯2k} ⊆ F (t).
Now let n = R(n¯1). Since R(n¯1) = R(n¯2), we also have that n =
R(n¯2). Thus {n¯1k, n¯2k} ⊆ n. This and the last sentence of the previous
paragraph imply that {n¯1k, n¯2k} ⊆ F (t)∩n.
Yet ((Ci)i, N) is a choice-set form by definition. Thus Lemma B.6
implies that |F (t)∩n| ≤ 1. This contradicts (45a) and the conclusion
of the last paragraph. 2
Lemma D.2. R̂ (17) is onto the class of choice-set forms (14).
Proof. Suppose that ((Ci)i, N) is a choice-set form. I will construct
an N¯ such that (a) ((Ci)i, N¯) is an OR
∗ choice-sequence form (6) with
no-absent-mindedness (16) and (b) R(N¯) = N . By the definition of R̂
this suffices to show that R̂ takes ((Ci)i, N¯) to ((Ci)i, N).
Step 1 will construct N¯ . Steps 5 and 6 will derive (a) and (b). Steps
2–4 will provide intermediate results.
Step 1: Definition of N¯ .
First, I derive some objects from ((Ci)i, N). As usual, define C by
∪iCi, T by (9), F by (10), and p by (11). Further, (8d) implies the
existence of a function c∗:Tr{{}}→C that takes each nonempty t to its
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unique last choice c∗(t). Note that p(t)∪{c∗(t)} = t for any nonempty
t.
Second, define (Tk)k≥0 by Tk = { t | |t|=k }. By the definition of T ,
∪kTk = T .(47)
Also, since {} ∈ N by Lemma B.5,
T0 = {{}} .(48)
Third, I define a sequence (Qk)k≥0 of functions in which each function
Qk maps each set t∈Tk to some finite sequence in C. I do this recur-
sively. To begin, recall T0 = {{}} by (48) and define the one-element
function Q0 by
Q0({}) := {} .(49)
Thus the empty set t = {} is mapped to the empty sequence {}. Then,
for any k≥1, use Qk−1 to define Qk at each t∈Tk by
Qk(t) := Qk−1(p(t))⊕(c∗(t)) .(50)
Since t ∈ Tk implies p(t) ∈ Tk−1, each Qk−1(p(t)) is well-defined.
Finally, define
N¯ := ∪kQk(Tk) ∪ { s¯ | (∀`≥1)1s¯`∈∪kQk(Tk) } ,(51)
where s¯ denotes an arbitrary sequence in C. From ((Ci)i, N¯) derive T¯
by (2) and, for later use, derive F¯ by (3). Since every value of every
Qk is a finite sequence, the definition of N¯ implies
T¯ = ∪kQk(Tk) and(52a)
N¯rT¯ = { s¯ | (∀`≥1)1s¯`∈T¯ } .(52b)
Step 2: An intermediate result (54) about (Qk(Tk))k.
This paragraph shows by induction that
(∀k)(∀t∈Tk) L(Qk(t)) = k .(53)
This holds at k = 0 because T0 = {{}} by (48) and because L(Q0({}))
= L({}) = 0 by (49). Further, it holds at any k≥1 if it holds at k−1
because
(∀t∈Tk) L(Qk(t) ) = L(Qk−1(p(t))⊕ (c∗(t)) )
= L(Qk−1(p(t)) ) + 1
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= (k−1) + 1
= k ,
where the first equality holds by the definition (50) of Qk, and the third
by the inductive hypothesis.
I now argue from the previous paragraph that
(∀k) { t¯ | L(t¯)=k } = Qk(Tk) .(54)
The ⊇ direction follows from (53) at k. To show the ⊆ direction,
take any t¯ such that L(t¯) = k. By (52a), there exists a k′ such that
t¯ ∈ Qk′(Tk′). Thus (53) at k′ implies L(t¯) = k′. Therefore, k = k′ by
the last and the third-to-last sentences, and hence t¯ ∈ Qk(Tk) by the
second-to-last sentence.
Step 3: An intermediate result (57) showing R|T¯ is a bijection.
This paragraph shows by induction that
(∀k)(∀t∈Tk) R(Qk(t)) = t .(55)
This holds at k=0 because T0 = {{}} by (48) and because R(Q0({})) =
R({}) = {} by (49). Further, it holds at k≥1 if it holds at k−1 because
(∀t∈Tk) R(Qk(t) ) = R
(
Qk−1(p(t))⊕ (c∗(t))
)
= R
(
Qk−1(p(t))
) ∪ {c∗(t)}
= p(t) ∪ {c∗(t)}
= t ,
where the first equality holds by the definition (50) of Qk, and the third
holds by the inductive hypothesis.
By (55) we have that
(∀k) Qk = (R|Qk(Tk))−1 is a bijection from Tk onto Qk(Tk) .(56)
By the definition of (Tk)k, the members of {Tk|k} are disjoint. Further,
by (54), the members of {Qk(Tk)|k} are disjoint. Thus (56) implies that
∪kQk = (R|∪kQk(Tk))−1 is a bijection from ∪kTk onto ∪kQk(Tk) .
Hence, since ∪kTk = T by (47) and since ∪kQk(Tk) = T¯ by (52a),
∪kQk = (R|T¯ )−1 is a bijection from T onto T¯ .
Therefore
R|T¯ = (∪kQk)−1 is a bijection from T¯ onto T .(57)
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Step 4: An intermediate result (61) about concatenation.
First, this paragraph argues
(∀k≥1)(∀t[∈Tk−1)(∀c)(∀t∈Tk)(58)
Qk−1(t[)⊕(c) = Qk(t)
⇔ Qk−1(t[)⊕(c) = Qk−1(p(t))⊕(c∗(t))
⇔ Qk−1(t[)=Qk−1(p(t)) and c=c∗(t)
⇔ t[=p(t) and c=c∗(t)
⇔ c/∈t[ and t[∪{c} = t .
The first equivalence holds by the definition (50) of Qk. The second
equivalence holds by breaking the vector equality into two components.
The third equivalence holds by applying R and (57) to the first equality.
The fourth equivalence holds by the definitions of p and c∗.
Next, this paragraph argues
(∀t[, c, t) (∪kQk)(t[)⊕(c) = (∪kQk)(t)(59)
⇔ c/∈t[ and t[∪{c}=t .
Take any t[, c, and t. Assume the left-hand side. By the definition of
(Qk)k and the disjointness of their domains, (∪kQk)(t[) = Q|t[|(t[) and
(∪kQk)(t) = Q|t|(t). Thus the left-hand side implies
Q|t[|(t
[)⊕(c) = Q|t|(t) .(60)
Two applications of (54) imply L(Q|t[|(t
[)) = |t[| and L(Q|t|(t)) = |t|.
Thus (60) implies |t|≥1 and |t[|=|t|−1. Hence (60) and (58) at k=|t|
imply the right-hand side. Conversely, assume the right-hand side. The
right-hand side implies |t|≥1 and |t[|=|t|−1. Hence the right-hand side
and (58) at k=|t| imply (60). (60) immediately implies the left-hand
side.
Finally, this paragraph argues
(∀t¯ [, c, t¯) t¯ [⊕(c) = t¯(61)
⇔ c/∈R(t¯ [) and R(t¯ [)∪{c} = R(t¯) .
Accordingly, take any t¯ [, c, and t¯. Then define t[ = R(t¯ [) and t = R(t¯).
I argue
t¯ [⊕(c) = t¯
⇔ (∪kQk)(t[)⊕(c) = (∪kQk)(t)
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⇔ c/∈t[ and t[∪{c} = t
⇔ c/∈R(t¯ [) and R(t¯ [)∪{c} = R(t¯) .
The first equivalence holds by (57) and the definitions of t[ and t. The
second equivalence holds by (59). The third equivalence holds by the
definitions of t[ and t.
Step 5: Proving ((Ci)i, N¯) is an OR
∗ choice-sequence form with no-
absent-mindedness.
By definition, ((Ci)i, N¯) is an OR
∗ choice-sequence form (6) iff (C, N¯)
is an OR∗ choice-sequence preform (1) and ((Ci)i, N¯) satisfies (6b–c).
Accordingly, I will show (1a–e), (6b–c), and no-absent-mindedness.
(1a). Return to the definition (51) of N¯ . Since every Qk(Tk) is a
collection of sequences in C, N¯ is also a collection of sequences in C.
Further, N¯ is nonempty because Q0(T0) is nonempty by (48) and (49).
(1b). To show that C ⊆ ∪R(N¯), take any c. By (8b), there is an n
such that c ∈ n. Thus, either by n ∈ T , or by n /∈ T and (8c), there is
a t such that c ∈ t. By (57), there exists t¯ such that t = R(t¯). Then
c ∈ t = R(t¯) ⊆ ∪R(T¯ ) ⊆ ∪R(N¯) ,
where the set membership follows from the definition of t, the equality
follows from the definition of t¯, and the last inclusion follows from the
definition of T¯ .
(1c). This has been established by (52b).
(1d). Take any t¯ ∈ T¯r{{}}. By (54), t¯ ∈ QL(t¯)(TL(t¯)). Thus there
exists t ∈ TL(t¯) such that t¯ = QL(t¯)(t). Since t¯ 6= {} by assumption,
L(t¯) ≥ 1. By the last two sentences and the definition (50) of QL(t¯)−1,
we have
t¯ = QL(t¯)(t) = QL(t¯)−1(p(t))⊕ (c∗(t)) .(62)
I then argue
1t¯L(t¯)−1 = QL(t¯)−1(p(t)) ∈ QL(t¯)−1(TL(t¯)−1) ⊆ T¯ .
The first equality is the initial component of (62). The set membership
follows from p(t) ∈ TL(t¯)−1, which follows from t ∈ TL(t¯). And finally,
the set inclusion follows from (52a).
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(1e). This paragraph shows that the assumptions of Lemma C.1 are
satisfied. The previously derived (1a) implies (i). The assumed (8a)
implies (ii). (57) implies (iii). (61) implies (iv).
Thus by Lemma C.1(c), (1e) is equivalent to the assumed (8e).
(6b). This is identical to the assumed (14b).
(6c). The third-to-last paragraph showed that the assumptions of
Lemma C.1 are satisfied. Thus by Lemma C.1(d), (6c) is equivalent to
the assumed (14c).
No-absent-mindedness. I have just shown that ((Ci)i, N¯) is an OR
∗
choice-sequence form. Further, R|T¯ is injective by (57). Thus Proposi-
tion 4.1(a⇐b) implies no-absent-mindedness.
Step 6: Proving R(N¯) = N .
R(N¯) ⊆ N . By (57) and the definition of T , R(T¯ ) = T ⊆ N . Thus
it suffices to show that R(N¯rT¯ ) ⊆ N . Accordingly, take any n¯ ∈ N¯rT¯ .
Define T ∗ = {R(1n¯`)|`≥1}. The remainder of this paragraph argues
that T ∗ is an infinite chain in T . (1) Every R(1n¯`) is in T , because
every 1n¯` is in T¯ by the derived (1c), and because R(T¯ ) = T by (57).
Hence T ∗ ⊆ T . (2) Note that (∀`) R(1n¯`) ⊆ R(1n¯`+1) simply because
1n¯` ⊆ 1n¯`+1. Hence T ∗ is a chain. (3) By Lemma A.5(b) and the
derived no-absent-mindedness, we have (∀`) |R(1n¯`)| = `. This implies
that T ∗ is infinite.
I argue
R(n¯) = R(∪{1n¯`|`}) = ∪{R(1n¯`)|`} = ∪T ∗ ∈ NrT ⊆ N.
The first equality holds because n¯ is an infinite sequence. The second
quality holds by manipulation. The third equality holds by the defini-
tion of T ∗. The set membership follows from assumption (8c) and the
last paragraph’s result that T ∗ is an infinite chain in T .
R(N¯) ⊇ N . By (57) and the definition of T¯ , T = R(T¯ ) ⊆ R(N¯).
Thus it suffices to show that NrT ⊆ R(N¯). Accordingly, take any
n ∈ NrT .
This paragraph derives an infinite sequence s¯ from the set n. By the
assumed (8c), there exists an infinite chain T ∗ ⊆ T such that ∪T ∗ = n.
Thus by Lemma B.7, there exists (tk)k≥1 such that (∀k) tk ⊂ tk+1 and
∪ktk = n. Then by (57), there exists (t¯k)k≥1 such that (∀k) R(t¯k) = tk.
The last two sentences imply (∀k) R(t¯k) ⊂ R(t¯k+1). This strict inclu-
sion has two implications. First, by two applications of Lemma A.5(b)
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and the derived no-absent-mindedness, we have
(∀k) L(t¯k) = |R(t¯k)| < |R(t¯k+1)| = L(t¯k+1) .(63)
Second, by the zipper Lemma A.7, we have
(∀k) t¯ k = t¯ k+1
L(tk)
.(64)
(63) and (64) together imply that ∪k t¯k is an infinite sequence. Accord-
ingly, define s¯ = ∪k t¯k. (It need not be the case that (∀k) L(t¯k)+1 =
L(t¯k+1).)
This paragraph argues
s¯ ∈ N¯rT¯ .(65)
By the derived (1c), it suffices to show that
(∀`≥1) 1s¯` ∈ T¯ .
Accordingly, take any `. By (63), (64), and the definition of s¯, there ex-
ists some k such that 1s¯` = 1t¯
k
` . This 1t¯
k
` is in T¯ by L(t¯
k)−` applications
of the derived (1d).
This paragraph argues
R(s¯) = R(∪k t¯k) = ∪kR(t¯k) = ∪ktk = n .(66)
The first equality follows from the definition of s¯. The second equality
follows by manipulation. The third equality follows from the definition
of (t¯k)k. The final equality follows from the definition of (t
k)k.
Finally,
n = R(s¯) ∈ R(N¯rT¯ ) ⊆ R(N¯) ,
where the equality is (66) and the set membership follows from (65).
2
Proof D.3 (for Theorem 2).
By Theorem 1(a), R̂ is a function, from the class of OR∗ choice-
sequence forms with no-absent-mindedness, into the class of choice-set
forms. By Lemma D.1, it is injective. By Lemma D.2, it is surjective.
2
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Appendix E. For Corollaries
Proof E.1 (for Corollary 5.1).
(a). ⇐. This follows immediately from the definition of p.
⇒. By Theorem 2 and the definition (17) of R̂, there exists an OR∗
choice-sequence form (6) ((Ci)i, N¯), with no-absent-mindedness (16),
such that R(N¯) = N . Derive T¯ by (2).
Now suppose t[ ⊂ t. By Theorem 1(c), there exists t¯ [ and t¯ such
that R(t¯ [) = t[ and R(t¯) = t. Note
R(t¯ [) = t[ ⊂ t = R(t¯) .(67)
I argue
t¯ [ = 1t¯L(t¯ [) = 1t¯|R(t¯ [)| = 1t¯|t[| .(68)
The first equality holds by (67) and the zipper Lemma A.7. The second
equality holds by Lemma A.5(b). The third equality holds by the
definition of t¯ [.
Since t[ ⊂ t, |t[| < |t|. Thus (68) and |t|−|t[| applications of Theo-
rem 1(f) imply that t[ = p|t|−|t
[|(t).
(b). Take any t. Note that (∀t′ 6={}) p(t′) ⊂ t′ by the definition of p.
Thus {pj(t) | |t|≥j≥1} is both a chain and a subcollection of {t[|t[⊂t}.
It remains to be shown that, for all t[, t[ ⊂ t implies the existence of
a j satisfying both t[=pj(t) and |t| ≥ j≥ 1. Accordingly, take some t[
such that t[ ⊂ t. By part (a), t[ = pj(t) for j set equal to |t|−|t[| ≥ 1.
Further, |t[| ≥ 0 implies j ≤ |t|. 2
Proof E.2 (for Corollary 5.2).
Derive p by (11).
(a). This paragraph defines t] such that t ⊂ t] ⊆ n]. On the one
hand, if n] ∈T , let t] = n]. On the other hand, suppose n] /∈ T . Then
by (8c) there exists an infinite chain T ∗ such that ∪T ∗ = n]. Thus
since t is a finite subset of n], there is some t] ∈ T ∗ such that t ⊂ t].
By Corollary 5.1(b), there exists a j≥1 such that t = pj(t]). Thus
there exists a c such that c ∈ F (t) and t∪{c} = pj−1(t]) (where p0(t])
is defined to be t]). Since the second of these statements implies c ∈ t],
the two statements together imply c ∈ F (t)∩t]. Finally, since t] ⊆ n]
by the definition of t], we have c ∈ F (t)∩n].
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(b). Suppose n⊂n]. If n] ∈T , then n∈T follows immediately from
the definition of T . Accordingly, suppose n] /∈T . Then by (8c), there
exists an infinite chain T ∗ such that n] =∪T ∗.
Since n⊂n], we may take c] ∈n]rn. Since n] =∪T ∗, we may then
take some t] ∈T ∗ such that c] ∈ t]. For future purposes, define p0(t]) =
t] and note that p0(t]) 6⊆n by the ends of the last two sentences.
The set { pj(t])⊆n | |t]|≤j≤1 } is a nonempty finite chain because
p|t
]|(t]) = ∅. Thus we may let pj(t]) be its maximum. If j=1, the last
paragraph showed p0(t]) 6⊆n. If j≥2, the definition of j implies that
pj−1(t]) 6⊆n. Thus in either contingency we have
pj(t]) ⊆ n and(69a)
pj−1(t]) 6⊆ n .(69b)
The definition of p allows us to define cj as the sole element of
pj−1(t])rpj(t]) (if j=1, this cj happens to be the c] from the second
paragraph). Thus (69) implies
cj /∈ n .(70)
Further the definition of j and definition of F imply
cj ∈ F (pj(t])) .(71)
And finally, the definition of cj, the definition of p, the definition of t],
and the definition of T ∗ imply
cj ∈ pj−1(t]) ⊆ t] ⊆ ∪T ∗ = n] .(72)
This paragraph shows that pj(t]) = n. By (69a), I need only rule out
pj(t]) ⊂ n. Accordingly, suppose pj(t]) ⊂ n. By part (a), this implies
the existence of a c ∈ F (pj(t])) such that c ∈ n. Since cj /∈ n by (70),
it must be that c 6= cj. Thus c and cj are distinct elements of F (pj(t]))
by (71) and the definition of c. Hence they cannot both belong to the
same node by Lemma B.6. Thus, since cj ∈ n] by (72), we have c /∈ n].
But this contradicts c ∈ n ⊂ n], which must hold by the definition of
c and the initial assumption that n ⊂ n].
Since n = pj(t]) by the previous paragraph, n is an element of T .
(c). Suppose (∃n]) n⊂n]. By part (b), n ∈ T . Thus by part (a) at
t = n, F (n)∩n] 6= ∅. This implies that F (n) 6= ∅, or in other words,
that n ∈ F−1(C).
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Conversely, suppose t ∈ F−1(C) (the notation t is not restrictive
since F−1(C) ⊆ T ). Then there exists c ∈ F (t) and we may set n] =
t∪{c}. 2
Proof E.3 (for Corollary 5.3).
By Theorem 2 and the definition (17) of R̂, there exists an OR∗ choice-
sequence form (6) ((Ci)i, N¯), with no-absent-mindedness (16), such
that R(N¯) = N . Derive T¯ by (2).
(a). Since R(N¯) = N , there exists n¯ such that R(n¯) = n. By (1c),
(1n¯k)k≥0 is a sequence in T¯ . Thus by Theorem 1(c), we may define
(tk)k≥0 by
(∀k) tk = R(1n¯k) .(73)
Note that
t0 = R(1n¯0) = {} ,
where the first equality follows from the definition of t0, and the second
holds because 1n¯0 was defined to be {}. Further,
(∀k≥1) p(tk) = p(R(1n¯k)) = R(1n¯k−1) = tk−1 ,
where the first and third equalities follow from the definition of (tk)k,
and the second equality follows from Theorem 1(f). Finally, note that
n = R(n¯) = R(∪{1n¯k|k}) = ∪{R(1n¯k)|k} = ∪{tk|k} ,
where the first equality is the definition of n¯, the next two equalities
hold by manipulation, and the last equality holds by the definition
of (tk)k≥1. The equations of the last three sentences establish that
(tk)k≥1 satisfies the three equations of part (a). Thus existence has
been established.
To show uniqueness, suppose that (sk)k≥0 is any sequence of sets in
T that satisfies the three equations of part (a). Then
n=∪{sk|k}, s0={}, and (∀k≥1) p(sk)=sk−1 .(74)
The last two of these equalities and the definition of p together imply
that |s0| = 0 and (∀k≥1) |sk| = |sk−1|+1. Thus (∀k) |sk| = k.
By Theorem 1(c), we may define (s¯k)k≥0 in T¯ by (∀k) sk = R(s¯k).
The last two sentences imply, among other things, that (∀k) |R(s¯k)| =
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k. By the no-absent-mindedness of ((Ci)i, N¯) and Lemma A.5(b), the
last sentence implies
(∀k) L(s¯k) = k .(75)
For use in the next paragraph, note
(∀k) p(R(s¯k+1)) = R(1s¯k+1L(s¯k+1)−1) = R(1s¯k+1k ) ,(76)
where the first equality follows from Theorem 1(f) at t¯ = s¯k+1, and the
second equality follows from (75) at k+1.
This paragraph argues
(∀k) s¯k = R|−1
N¯
(sk) = R|−1
N¯
(p(sk+1))(77)
= R|−1
N¯
(p(R(s¯k+1))) = R|−1
N¯
(R(1s¯
k+1
k )) = 1s¯
k+1
k .
The first equality follows from the definition of s¯k and Theorem 1(b).
The second equality follows from the last statement in (74). The third
equality follows from the definition of s¯k+1. The fourth equality follows
from (76). The last equality holds if 1s¯
k+1
k ∈ N¯ , and this set member-
ship holds because (1) s¯k+1∈T¯ by its definition, (2) L(s¯k+1)=k+1 by
(75), and thus (3) 1s¯
k+1
k ∈T¯ by (1d).
(77) implies that ∪{s¯k|k} is a sequence. Denote it m¯ (so as to distin-
guish it from the n¯ defined in the first paragraph of this proof of part
(a)). Since (∀k) L(s¯k) = k by (75), we have
(∀k) 1m¯k = s¯k .(78)
Thus the definition of s¯k implies that (∀k) 1m¯k ∈ T¯ . Hence (1c) implies
that m¯ ∈ N¯ .
Notice that
R(m¯) = R(∪{s¯k|k}) = ∪{R(s¯k)|k} = ∪{sk|k} = n ,
where the first equality holds by the definition of m¯, the second equality
holds by manipulation, the third equality holds by the definition of
(s¯k)k, and the final equality holds by the first statement in (74). Thus,
since R(n¯) also equals n by the definition of n¯, Theorem 1(b) implies
that m¯ = n¯. So
(∀k) sk = R(s¯k) = R(1m¯k) = R(1n¯k) = tk ,
where the first equality holds by the definition of s¯k, the second equal-
ity holds by (78), the third equality holds by the last sentence, and
the last equality is the definition (73) of tk. Therefore, since (sk)k≥0
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was assumed to be any sequence in T solving the three conditions of
part (a), (tk)k≥0 is the only such sequence.
(b). Recall the very first paragraph of this proof, which began before
the proof of part (a). The statement of part (b) uses part (a) to define
(tk)k≥0 as the unique sequence of sets that satisfies
n=∪{tk|k} , t0={} , and (∀k≥1) p(tk)=tk−1 .(79)
By the last two of these three equations, {tk|k} is an infinite chain.
Thus it remains to be shown that
{n[|n[⊂n} = {tk|k} .
To see the ⊇ direction, take any tk. Then tk ⊆ n by the first equality
in the definition (79) of (tk)k. Further, t
k ⊂ n since tk is finite and n
is infinite by assumption.
To see the ⊆ direction, take any n[ ⊂ n. Note that n[ ∈ T by Corol-
lary 5.2(b). This and the next paragraph will incorporate n[ into an
infinite sequence (sk)k≥0 in T . First, define (sk)
|n[|
k=0 by s
k = p|n
[|−k(n[),
where p0(n[) is set equal to n[. It follows immediately that
s0 = {} , (∀1≤k≤|n[|) p(sk) = sk−1 ,(80a)
and (∀0≤k≤|n[|) sk ⊂ n .(80b)
Second, define (sk)k≥|n[|+1 recursively as follows. [1] Take k≥|n[|+1
and assume
sk−1 ⊂ n .(81)
[2] By Lemma 5.2(a), take ck ∈ F (sk−1)∩n, where F is defined by (10).
[3] Since ck ∈ F (sk−1), define sk = sk−1∪{ck}. Note that
p(sk) = sk−1 .(82)
[4] Also note that sk = sk−1∪{ck} ⊆ n since sk−1 ⊂ n by (81) and since
ck ∈ n by the definition of ck. This implies
sk ⊂ n(83)
because sk is finite by construction and n is infinite by assumption.
This four-step recursion can be initiated at k=|n[|+1 because (81) at
k=|n[|+1 is (80b) at k=|n[|. The recursion can be sustained because
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(81) at k is (83) at k−1. Finally, by (82) and (83) within this recursion,
we have
(∀k≥|n[|+1) p(sk) = sk−1(84a)
and (∀k≥|n[|+1) sk ⊂ n .(84b)
Equations (80a) and (84a) imply that {sk|k} is an infinite chain in T .
Thus by (8c), ∪ksk is an infinite member of N . Meanwhile, (80b) and
(84b) imply that ∪ksk ⊆ n. The last two sentences and Corollary 5.2(b)
imply that ∪ksk = n.
The conclusion of the last paragraph, (80a), and (84a) imply that
n=∪ksk , s0={} , and (∀k≥1) p(sk)=sk−1 .
Thus, by the uniqueness in the definition of (tk)k at the start of this
proof of part (b), (sk)k = (t
k)k. So
n[ = s|n
[| = t|n
[| ,
where the first equality is the definition of s|n
[| and the second equality
follows from the previous sentence. Consequently, n[ ∈ {tk|k}. 2
Lemma E.4. 15 Suppose that ((Ci)i, N¯) is an OR
∗ choice-sequence
form (6) with no-absent-mindedness (16). Derive its T¯ (2). Then if
R(n¯[) ⊂ R(n¯), the following hold.
(a) n¯[ ∈ T¯ .
(b) If n¯ ∈ T¯ , then L(n¯[) < L(n¯) and n¯[ = 1n¯L(n¯[).
(c) If n¯ /∈ T¯ , then n¯[ = 1n¯L(n¯[).
Proof. (a). Let N = R(N¯). By Theorem 1(a), ((Ci)i, N) is a choice-
set form. Note that R(n¯[) and R(n¯) are nodes in N . Thus, the assump-
tion R(n¯[) ⊂ R(n¯) and Corollary 5.2(b) imply that R(n¯[) ∈ T , where
T is defined by (9). Hence n¯[ ∈ T¯ by Theorem 1(b,c).
15Lemmata E.4 and E.5 are needed by Proof E.6. Incidentally, they also appear
to be new results for choice-sequence forms. They derive conclusions from no-
absent-mindedness. For example, conclusion (a) of Lemma E.4 rules out the exis-
tence of an infinite sequence whose every choice is also made along a distinct second
infinite sequence. [This implies that no sequence (in N¯) is an infinite “subsequence”
of another sequence (in N¯), where in this sentence only, the term “subsequence”
is used as it would be in topology rather than as it was defined in Section 2.1.]
Conclusions (b) and (c) go a step further. They state that if every choice of a
sequence is also made along a distinct second sequence, then the first sequence is a
(finite) “subsequence” of the second in the precise sense of Section 2.1.
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(b). Suppose n¯ ∈ T¯ . By part (a), n¯[ ∈ T¯ . Since both sequences
are finite, two applications of Lemma A.5(b) and the assumption that
R(n¯[) ⊂ R(n¯) imply that
L(n¯[) = |R(n¯[)| < |R(n¯)| = L(n¯) .
Further, the zipper Lemma A.7 implies n¯[ = 1n¯L(n¯[).
(c). Suppose n¯ /∈ T¯ . Since R(n¯[) ⊂ R(n¯) by assumption and since
R(n¯[) is finite by part (a), there is some k such that R(n¯[) ⊆ R(1n¯k).
By part (a), n¯[ ∈ T¯ . By (1c), 1n¯k ∈ T¯ . The last three sentences and
the zipper Lemma A.7 imply
L(n¯[) ≤ L(1n¯k) and(85a)
n¯[ = 1(1n¯k)L(n¯[) .(85b)
Since L(1n¯k) = k, (85a) implies L(n¯
[) ≤ k. Thus (85b) simplifies to
n¯[ = 1n¯L(n¯[). 2
Lemma E.5. Suppose that ((Ci)i, N¯) is an OR
∗ choice-sequence form
(6) with no-absent-mindedness (16). Take any distinct n¯1 and n¯2, and
let
K := { k≥0 | k≤L(n¯1) if n¯1 is finite and
k≤L(n¯2) if n¯2 is finite } .
Then for any k∗∈K,
k∗ = max{ k∈K | 1n¯1k = 1n¯2k }
⇔ R(1n¯1k∗) = max{ R(m¯) | R(m¯)⊆R(n¯1)∩R(n¯2) } ,
where m¯ is an arbitrary element of N¯ .
Proof.
⇒ Direction. Suppose
k∗ = max{ k∈K | 1n¯1k=1n¯2k } .(86)
Since k∗∈K, both R(1n¯1k∗) and R(1n¯2k∗) are well-defined. Clearly
R(1n¯
1
k∗) ⊆ R(n¯1). Also, by (86), R(1n¯1k∗) = R(1n¯2k∗) ⊆ R(n¯2). Thus by
the last two sentences, R(1n¯
1
k∗) ⊆ R(n¯1)∩R(n¯2).
Hence it remains to be shown that
(∀m¯) R(m¯)⊆R(n¯1)∩R(n¯2) ⇒ R(m¯)⊆R(1n¯1k∗) .
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Accordingly, take any m¯ such that R(m¯)⊆R(n¯1)∩R(n¯2). If R(m¯) was
equal both R(n¯1) and R(n¯2), Proposition 4.1 would imply that m¯ was
equal to both n¯1 and n¯2, which would imply n¯1=n¯2 in contradiction
to the assumption that n¯1 and n¯2 are distinct. Accordingly, assume
without loss of generality that R(m¯)⊂R(n¯1) and R(m¯)⊆R(n¯2).
By R(m¯)⊂R(n¯1) and Lemma E.4(a,b,c), m¯ is finite and
m¯ = 1n¯
1
L(m¯) .(87)
The remainder of the paragraph shows
m¯ = 1n¯
2
L(m¯) .(88)
Either R(m¯)=R(n¯2) or R(m¯)⊂R(n¯2). In the first case, Proposition 4.1
implies m¯=n¯2. Thus (88) holds because m¯ is finite by the first sentence
of this paragraph. In the second case, (88) holds by Lemma E.4(b,c).
By (87) and (88), 1n¯
1
L(m¯) = 1n¯
2
L(m¯). Thus by (86), L(m¯) ≤ k∗. So by
(87) and the previous sentence,
R(m¯) = R(1n¯
1
L(m¯)) ⊆ R(1n¯1k∗) .
⇐ Direction. Suppose that k∗∈K satisfies
R(1n¯
1
k∗) = max{ R(m¯) | R(m¯)⊆R(n¯1)∩R(n¯2) } .(89)
Then R(1n¯
1
k∗) ⊆ R(n¯2). On the one hand, suppose R(1n¯1k∗) = R(n¯2).
Then Proposition 4.1 implies 1n¯
1
k∗=n¯
2, which immediately implies
1n¯
1
k∗ = 1n¯
2
k∗ .(90)
On the other hand, suppose R(1n¯
1
k∗) ⊂ R(n¯2). Then Lemma E.4(b,c)
implies 1n¯
1
k∗ = 1n¯
2
L(1n¯
1
k∗ )
, which implies (90) because L(1n¯
1
k∗) = k
∗.
Since (90) implies k∗ ∈ { k∈K | 1n¯1k=1n¯2k }, it remains to show
(∀k∈K) 1n¯1k=1n¯2k ⇒ k≤k∗ .
Accordingly, take any k∈K such that 1n¯1k=1n¯2k. Then
R(1n¯
1
k) ⊆ R(n¯1)∩R(n¯2) .
By (89), this implies R(1n¯
1
k) ⊆ R(1n¯1k∗), which implies |R(1n¯1k)| ≤
|R(1n¯1k∗)|. By Lemma A.5(b), this is equivalent to L(1n¯1k) ≤ L(1n¯1k∗),
which is equivalent to k ≤ k∗. 2
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Proof E.6 (for Corollary 5.4).
By Theorem 2 and the definition (17) of R̂, there exists an OR∗ choice-
sequence form (6) ((Ci)i, N¯), with no-absent-mindedness (16), such
that R(N¯) = N . Derive T¯ by (2).
Take any n1 and n2 in N . If n1 = n2, then both parts of the corollary
hold vacuously. Accordingly, assume n1 6= n2. By the definition of N¯ ,
we may let n¯1 and n¯2 be such that n1=R(n¯1) and n2=R(n¯2). Because
n1 6= n2, Theorem 1(b) implies n¯1 6= n¯2.
Define the set K as in Lemma E.5. Since n¯1 6= n¯2,
k∗ := max{ k∈K | 1n¯1k=1n¯2k } .
is well-defined. By Lemma E.5,
R(1n¯
1
k∗) = max{ R(m¯) | R(m¯)⊆R(n¯1)∩R(n¯2) } ,
where m¯ is an arbitrary member of N¯ . Thus by the definition of N¯ ,
R(1n¯
1
k∗) = max{ m | m⊆R(n¯1)∩R(n¯2) } .
where m is an arbitrary member of N . Thus
R(1n¯
1
k∗) = max{ m | m⊆n1∩n2 } = n1∧n2 ,(91)
where the first equality holds by the previous sentence and the defini-
tions of n¯1 and n¯2, and the second equality holds by the definition of
∧. This establishes part (a).
Further, since 1n¯
1
k∗ ∈ T¯ , Theorem 1(c) implies that R(1n¯1k∗) ∈ T .
Hence by (91), n1∧n2 ∈ T . This establishes part (b). 2
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